Finding a Better Analogy for the Right of Publicity by Coyle, Andrew T.
Brooklyn Law Review
Volume 77 | Issue 3 Article 6
2012
Finding a Better Analogy for the Right of Publicity
Andrew T. Coyle
Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/blr
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brooklyn Law Review
by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.
Recommended Citation





Finding a Better Analogy for the Right 
of Publicity 
INTRODUCTION 
The right of publicity is the simple idea that there “is 
[an] inherent right of every human being to control the 
commercial use of his or her identity.”1 Although conceptually 
straightforward, it has been the subject of significant 
commentary and debate.2 Neither courts nor scholars have 
accepted a uniform theoretical foundation for the right of 
publicity.3 Consequently, it has developed into a disjointed 
doctrine.4 Scholars invariably analogize to more grounded 
concepts in an attempt to rationalize and set limits on the 
right.5 When either justifying the right of publicity’s existence 
or resolving a doctrinal issue, writers have argued that the 
right of publicity should mirror copyright law,6 trademark law,7 
  
 1 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 1:3 (2d 
ed. 2011). 
 2 See, e.g., K.J. Greene, Intellectual Property Expansion: The Good, the Bad, 
and the Right of Publicity, 11 CHAP. L. REV. 521, 521 (2008) (“Is there really anything 
left to say about this topic, given the proliferation of writing on it in the last ten to 
fifteen years? A lot has been said about the right of publicity, most of it negative.”). 
 3 See Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture 
and Publicity Rights, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 125, 238 (1993) (“[T]he affirmative case for 
publicity rights is at best an uneasy one. Individually and cumulatively, the standard 
justifications are not nearly as compelling as is commonly supposed.”). 
 4 See Eric J. Goodman, A National Identity Crisis: The Need for a Federal 
Right of Publicity Statute, 9 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. & POL’Y 227, 228 (1999). 
 5 See, e.g., Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, What the Right of Publicity 
Can Learn from Trademark Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1163-64 (2006) (“This 
approach turns the right of publicity into a new form of IP right, one based explicitly on 
analogies to and justifications for real property. Thinking about the right of publicity 
by analogy to IP law may indeed be helpful.”). 
 6 Randall T.E. Coyne, Toward a Modified Fair Use Defense in the Right of 
Publicity Cases, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 781, 782 (1988) (arguing that the right of 
publicity should be structured in the same manner as the fair use doctrine under 
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or trademark dilution.8 Using tools from other academic 
disciplines, other scholars have argued for or against the right 
of publicity.9 Indeed, whenever scholars encounter the right of 
publicity, their first instinct is to compare it to something else. 
While these analogies often provide novel and insightful 
critiques, the commentaries often ignore the significant 
differences between whatever perspective they are arguing 
from and the right of publicity. Indeed, at least one 
commentator has noted that legal issues created by the right of 
publicity cannot be resolved by “automatic invocation of a 
ready-made framework.”10 One analogy that has been 
overlooked, which parallels the right of publicity and is far 
more practical than others frequently offered, is private 
contracting in the commercial and entertainment industries. In 
many ways, comparing this sort of private contracting is not an 
analogy at all, but a reference to business custom. Industry 
collective bargaining agreements protect similar interests as the 
right of publicity, and operate in many of the same ways.11 
Specifically, both the right of publicity and entertainment 
collective bargaining agreements developed out of the same 
social and technological changes.12 Collective bargaining 
agreements confer rights—the most important of which is the 
right to residual compensation13—to actors and performers to 
control and compensate those individuals for use of their 
personas within the contractual relationship.14 The right of 
publicity ensures individuals’ control of their personas from the 
world at large.15 The one discernible difference between collective 
bargaining and violations of the right of publicity is that the 
  
copyright law); Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Is Independence Day Dawning for the Right 
of Publicity?, 17 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 191, 192 (1983) (same). 
 7 See generally Dogan & Lemley, supra note 5. 
 8 See generally Sarah M. Konsky, Publicity Dilution: A Proposal for 
Protecting Publicity Rights, 21 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH L.J. 347 (2004). 
 9 See generally Alice Haemmerli, Whose Who? The Case for a Kantian Right 
of Publicity, 49 DUKE L.J. 383, 411-30 (1999) (arguing that the theories of Immanuel 
Kant justify the right of publicity); Madow, supra note 3 (arguing from a Cultural 
Studies perspective). 
 10 Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, The Right of Publicity vs. the First Amendment: 
A Property and Liability Rule Analysis, 70 IND. L.J. 47, 62 (1994). 
 11 See infra Part II.B. 
 12 See infra Part I. 
 13 See infra notes 203-09 and accompanying text. 
 14 See infra notes 198-204 and accompanying text. 
 15 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 1:3. 
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usage in contracts is with consent of the individual and usage 
that violates the right of publicity is without consent.16  
This note suggests a new method to analyze the right of 
publicity. Voluntary contracts within the entertainment 
industry provide an analytical tool to assess both the 
underlying policy justifications for the right of publicity and the 
doctrinal rules within it. First, in terms of an underlying 
justification for the right of publicity, reference to contracts and 
business practice shows that the right of publicity is not a half-
baked intellectual property right with little justification. 
Rather, this analytical framework supports unjust enrichment 
and natural rights theory justifications for the right of 
publicity—not labor theory and diminution-in-value 
justifications, as some scholars have suggested.17 Second, 
contractual structure in entertainment contracts, which is an 
industry standard determined through collective bargaining and 
protects similar interests as the right of publicity,18 provides a 
tool to analyze doctrinal rules within the right of publicity. 
Comparing entertainment contracts to the right of publicity 
supports extending the right of publicity to non-celebrities.19 
Additionally, entertainment contracts provide lawmakers and 
courts with a benchmark to determine whether unauthorized 
usage of an individual’s image or persona is incidental to, and 
therefore not infringing on, the right of publicity.20 
Given that unions dominate the commercial and 
entertainment industries,21 the most appropriate place to find 
standard entertainment contracts is coordinated collective 
bargaining agreements. Since right-of-publicity infringements 
are most prevalent in advertising due to First Amendment 
limitations,22 this note focuses primarily on the Commercial 
  
 16 Richard Goldstein & Arthur Kessler, Comment, The Twilight Zone: 
Meanderings in the Areas of Performers’ Rights, 9 UCLA L. REV. 819, 819-20 (1962). 
 17 See infra Part III. 
 18 See infra Part II. 
 19 See infra Part IV.A. 
 20 See infra Part IV.B. 
 21 See infra notes 165-68 and accompanying text. 
 22 See 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 8:16 
(2d ed. 2011) (“Today, advertising is labeled as ‘commercial speech’ which is within the 
First Amendment, but it enjoys a lower level of constitutional protection than does 
‘news’ or ‘entertainment.’ In some cases, its level of First Amendment protection seems 
so attenuated as to be practically nonexistent.”); Peter L. Felcher & Edward L. Rubin, 
Privacy, Publicity, and the Portrayal of Real People by the Media, 88 YALE L.J. 1577, 
1597-99 (1979) (arguing that news and entertainment have higher levels of 
constitutional protection and that commercial speech “is not regarded as being of 
constitutional proportions”). However, the right of publicity can prevail against even 
the strongest First Amendment interests. See, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. 
 
1136 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 77:3 
Contracts between the American Federation of Television and 
Radio Artists (AFTRA), Screen Actors Guild (SAG), Association 
of National Advertisers (ANA), and American Association of 
Advertising Agencies (AAAA). However, contractual relations 
in movies, television, radio programming, and screen writing 
are referenced when relevant. 
Part I compares the historical development of the right of 
publicity and collective bargaining in the commercial and 
entertainment industries. It argues that both developed in 
response to the same social and technological changes. Part II 
compares the current collective bargaining and right-of-publicity 
regimes. Part III analyzes the traditional justifications for the 
right of publicity and suggests, with reference to the contractual 
relations, that unjust enrichment and natural rights theories 
best justify the right of publicity. Part IV considers several rules 
within the right of publicity. First, this part argues that the 
right of publicity should extend to non-celebrities. By offering 
evidence that non-celebrities have commercial value when 
appropriated, this part concludes that the right should extend to 
all individuals. Finally, examining the incidental use doctrine 
for the right of publicity, this part suggests that judges and 
legislators should use analogous collective bargaining provisions 
as a benchmark in formulating incidental use doctrine. 
I. THE COMMON ORIGINS  
Many scholars trace the right of publicity back to the 
right of privacy.23 However, more nuanced accounts recognize 
that the right of publicity originated as a response to two 
phenomena: a cultural shift that placed higher value on 
celebrity and fame, and the inadequacy of privacy rights in 
protecting celebrity rights.24 The increased value of celebrity 
  
Co., 433 U.S. 562, 575 (1977) (holding that news broadcast infringed on a performer’s 
right of publicity by televising his entire act).  
 23 Most of these accounts begin with Samuel D. Warren and Louis Brandeis’s 
famous law review article The Right of Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 196 (1890), in 
which they argued for a new common law right that protected an individual’s privacy. 
See, e.g., Dogan & Lemley, supra note 5, at 1167-68; Seth A. Dymond, Comment, So 
Many Entertainers, So Little Protection: New York, The Right of Publicity, and the Need 
for Reciprocity, 47 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 447, 449 (2003); Alicia M. Hunt, Comment, 
Everyone Wants to Be a Star: Extensive Publicity Rights for Noncelebrities Unduly 
Restrict Commercial Speech, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1605, 1612 (2001). 
 24 See, e.g., Madow, supra note 3, at 167 (“The right of publicity was created 
not so much from the right of privacy as from frustration with it. Moreover, . . . the 
whole matter was negotiated by courts and commentators with something less than 
divine ease and grace.”). 
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occurred in three distinct periods. First, around the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century, society’s icons changed 
from those who were known for their accomplishments—such as 
inventors or political leaders—to actors and athletes.25 Second, in 
the first half of the twentieth century, mass media began to 
treat personality as a valuable commodity as the new celebrities 
were employed for commercial gain.26 Third, in the 1950’s, with 
the breakdown in the studio system and the invention of 
television, actors’ images became particularly vulnerable to 
misappropriation.27 As will be shown, modern collective 
bargaining in the entertainment and advertising industries 
derives from these same cultural shifts, which makes it the 
closest set of principles to the right of publicity. Thus, it was not 
the law that shaped the contractual relations here. Instead, both 
developed independently out of the same cultural shifts. 
A. The Invention of Celebrity, the Commodification of 
Persona, and the End of an Era 
1. Cultural and Technological Shifts Lead to 
Commodification of Persona 
The face of fame undeniably changed from the 
nineteenth to the twentieth century.28 Starting with the 
Revolutionary period, society’s heroes were civic leaders.29 At 
the time, merchants appropriated the founding fathers’ images 
with impunity.30 According to Professor Michael Madow, the 
founders “viewed their images as a kind of common republican 
property.”31 Indeed, given the treatment of public personas as 
common property, famous people seemingly had no right to 
prevent commercial appropriation of their image.32 Following 
the Revolutionary period, from 1820 to 1860, “poets, essayists, 
critics, historians, and preachers” wrote the national narrative, 
  
 25 Id. at 160-61; Amy Henderson, Media and the Rise of Celebrity Culture, OAH 
MAG. OF HIST., Spring 1992, at 49, 49 (“By [the] mid-twentieth century, the pedestal 
belonged not to politicians or generals, but to baseball players and movie stars.”). 
 26 See infra notes 61-63 and accompanying text. 
 27 See infra notes 79-84 and accompanying text. 
 28 Henderson, supra note 25, at 49. 
 29 Id. (“Above all other figures of the Revolutionary generation, George 
Washington stood as the great embodiment of national virtue, the symbol of the 
fledgling nation’s essential worthiness.”). 
 30 Madow, supra note 3, at 148-49. 
 31 Id. at 150. 
 32 Id. at 152. 
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but personas remained public property.33 Society knew the 
famous more by their words or actions than by their images.34 
By contrast, nineteenth-century society placed a low value on 
actors and performers.35 
Starting in the late nineteenth century, a new face of 
fame emerged. As a result of changes in technology and 
journalism,36 society’s attention focused on captains of industry 
and inventors.37 Specifically, the invention of photography and 
chromolithography revolutionized the reproduction of images.38 
In the 1880s, modern newspapers “were made possible by high-
speed presses, the linotype, halftone photo reproduction, and 
the emergence of news-gathering organizations such as the 
Associated Press.”39 These advancements lead to drastic 
changes in journalism, which Professor Madow describes as 
“genuinely pictorial or illustrated ‘personalities’ journalism.”40 
Magazines and newspapers began to focus on prominent 
members of society, and often printed their pictures.41 
It is within this period that Samuel D. Warren and 
Louis Brandeis wrote their renowned law review article on the 
right of privacy.42 In response to the press’s increasing interest 
in the private lives of prominent citizens43 and the widespread 
  
 33 Henderson, supra note 25, at 49; see also Madow, supra note 3, at 152 
(“According to the social historian Neil Harris, commercial exploitation of famous 
persons—living and dead, political and theatrical, fictional and real—was common 
throughout the nineteenth century . . . .”).  
 34 Madow, supra note 3, at 159. 
 35 Id. at 226 (“A century ago actors, entertainers, and athletes were still 
socially marginal and politically inconsequential.”). 
 36 Henderson, supra note 25, at 49-50 (explaining effects of “image 
reproduction and of facilities for mass dispersion of information”). Historian Daniel 
Boorstin termed the era the “Graphic Revolution.” Id. at 49; see also DANIEL J. 
BOORSTIN, THE IMAGE: A GUIDE TO PSEUDO-EVENTS IN AMERICA 47 (25th Anniversary 
ed., Vintage Books 1992) (1962) (describing how advances in technology create a 
mechanism to manufacture celebrities’ “well-knownness”). 
 37 Henderson, supra note 25, at 50 (describing how society came to idolize 
“hero-inventors” and “captains of industry”).  
 38 Id. at 49. 
 39 Id. at 49-50; see also Madow, supra note 3, at 157 (“The closing decades of 
the nineteenth century also brought several related changes in popular journalism. 
Daily newspaper circulation jumped from 2.6 million in 1870 to 8.4 million in 1890.”). 
 40 Madow, supra note 3, at 158. 
 41 See Henderson, supra note 25, at 50 (“The new magazines such as 
‘McClure’s’ that appeared in the 1890s also played a role in enlarging the popular 
imagination, thereby redefining ideals of fame, success, and national heroism.”); see 
also Madow, supra note 3, at 159. 
 42 See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 23. 
 43 Id. at 196 (“To occupy the indolent, column upon column is filled with idle 
gossip, which can only be procured by intrusion upon the domestic circle.”). 
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use of photographs in media,44 the authors advocated for a new 
common law doctrine that guaranteed private citizens the 
“right to be let alone.”45 This new right of privacy would 
ostensibly prevent publishers from printing private facts about, 
or photographs of, ordinary citizens.46 However, Warren and 
Brandeis carefully circumscribed an exception to the rule: “The 
right to privacy does not prohibit any publication of matter 
which is of public or general interest.”47 This exception often 
resulted in courts’ denying right-to-privacy actions for 
misappropriating famous people’s professional identities, under 
the theory that famous people waived their right of privacy.48  
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, a 
new face of fame emerged: the celebrity.49 Americans first 
became fixated with the personal lives of “political leaders, 
businessmen, financiers, scientists and inventors.”50 However, 
by the 1920s, society’s attention shifted to “film actors, 
entertainers, athletes, and the like, people who excelled in the 
world of play.”51 According to historian Daniel Boorstin, society 
no longer idolized men of merit who achieved status through 
accomplishment; instead, Americans worshiped “celebrities,” 
defined as those “who [are] known for [their] well-knownness.”52 
This shift in society’s interests resulted from social changes 
and technological advances.53 Foremost, dramatic alterations in 
national demographics occurred because of immigration. From 
1890 through the 1920s, approximately 23 million Eastern 
Europeans and Italians immigrated to the United States, many 
  
 44 Id. at 195 (“Instantaneous photographs and newspaper enterprise have 
invaded the sacred precincts of private and domestic life . . . .”). 
 45 Id. at 193. 
 46 Id. at 215 (“The general object in view is to protect the privacy of private 
life, and to whatever degree and in whatever connection a man’s life has ceased to be 
private, before the publication under consideration has been made, to that extent the 
protection is to be withdrawn.”). 
 47 Id. at 214. 
 48 See infra notes 117-21 and accompanying text.  
 49 See Henderson, supra note 25, at 50 (describing the public’s increasing 
fascination with entertainers starting in the 1880’s). 
 50 Madow, supra note 3, at 163 (citing LEO LOWENTHAL, The Triumph of 
Mass Idols, in LITERATURE, POPULAR CULTURE, AND SOCIETY 109, 109-14 (1961)); see 
also Henderson, supra note 25, at 50. 
 51 Madow, supra note 3, at 163. 
 52 BOORSTIN, supra note 36, at 57. According to Boorstin, modern celebrities 
are celebrated not for their achievements, but instead for constantly being in the public 
spotlight. See id. at 57-58. The creation of new celebrities is possible only through 
advancements in technology, which Boorstin labels the “Graphic Revolution.” Id. at 57. 
 53 Henderson, supra note 25, at 50 (discussing demographic changes and 
advancements in technology). 
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of them settling in eastern cities.54 This demographic change 
caused a cultural shift, much of which was “rooted in the 
entertainment industry.”55 Additionally, rapid technological 
advancement allowed mass media to expose the public to the 
new celebrity56 : the radio brought the celebrities’ voices into the 
nation’s homes.57 The motion picture captivated audiences and 
brought people closer to the actors with close-ups,58 creating a 
more personal connection not achievable in live theater.59 The 
television completed the creation of the modern celebrity by 
bringing the picture and sound of actors and performers into the 
home, which creates “the greatest degree of intimacy and 
familiarity between performers and their audiences.”60  
The rise of celebrity culture became associated with a 
larger sociological shift in America from a society of production 
to a society of consumption.61 According to some historians, 
American consumption required a new way to distinguish 
people within society; “[p]ersonality became a means to 
distinguish our individual selves from the mass.”62 Advertising 
practices reflected consumption of personalities.63 With these 
significant changes in culture and technology, personality 
arguably became a commodity.64 
  
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Fame, 73 IND. L.J. 1, 27 (1997) (“Our society’s 
view of fame was most influenced at the outset by print, and then was completely 
revolutionized in the wake of the birth of film and broadcasting.”). 
 57 Id. at 30 (“Radio, while lacking the visual aspect of film, created a new 
level of intimacy by bringing the performer to the listener ‘live.’ This intimacy allowed 
people to feel there was very little separating them from the celebrity.”); Henderson, 
supra note 25, at 52 (“Unlike movies, radio was a household presence: in 1934 an 
average radio cost about $35, and 60% of all American household had at least one set. 
And, unlike records, radio was live: entertainment and information were there at the 
touch of the dial.”). 
 58 Kwall, supra note 56, at 29 (“The motion picture, like the photograph, 
delivered a new level of realism, only it was superior to photographs in that it 
transcended the provision of stars’ images and allowed audiences to observe stars’ 
behaviors and mannerisms.”).  
 59 Madow, supra note 3, at 162 (“Moviegoers, in contrast [to those who 
attended stage performances], got to see their favorites regularly—and, most 
importantly, they got to see them in close-ups. This fostered an illusion of intimacy and 
generated widespread curiosity about the stars’ private lives and doings.”). 
 60 Kwall, supra note 56, at 31. 
 61 Henderson, supra note 25, at 50-51. 
 62 Id. at 51.  
 63 For example, Professor Madow points to two advertising practices using 
celebrities: product placements in movies and celebrity endorsements. Madow, supra 
note 3, at 164-65. 
 64 Id. at 166.  
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Mass media, and in particular early Hollywood, played a 
substantial role in the commodification of personality. For 
instance, mass media notoriously “packaged” celebrities⎯turning 
nobodies into the famous through a careful media strategy to 
maximize commercial value.65 Prior to the 1950s, despite society’s 
treatment of personality as a commodity for nearly half century, 
property law provided no rights to protect this new value.66 
2. Media Exploits and Expands the Commodity of 
Persona 
An explanation of the commodification of personality is 
incomplete without an analysis of the media structure itself. In 
particular, the motion picture industry, with its prominence 
before radio and television, played a substantial role in 
exploiting personas for commercial gain. Between 1912 and 
1915, movie producers moved to California and opened up the 
first studios.67 Studios in the first half of the twentieth century 
approached movie making like mass production.68 In a process 
known as vertical integration,69 studios dominated every aspect 
of the industry.70 They owned the film lots, the means to 
produce feature length movies, and the theaters where 
audiences watched the final products.71 Most importantly, the 
studios controlled the actors of the era. Prior to 1948, studios 
hired actors to work exclusively for them72 and controlled nearly 
every aspect of actors’ careers.73 One writer summarized, 
“Imagine working under a seven-year contract that you cannot 
break and more than likely will be forced to renew, for a 
producer who can tell you who you can marry, what your 
  
 65 Kwall, supra note 56, at 32-34. 
 66 See, e.g., infra notes 116-21 and accompanying text. 
 67 The Emergence of the Hollywood Studio System, FILMREFERENCE.COM, 
http://www.filmreference.com/encyclopedia/Romantic-Comedy-Yugoslavia/Studio-System-
THE-EMERGENCE-OF-THE-HOLLYWOODSTUDIO-SYSTEM.html (last visited Jan. 
10, 2012). 
 68 Id. 
 69 See id.; see also THOMAS SCHATZ, THE GENIUS OF THE SYSTEM: HOLLYWOOD 
FILMMAKING IN THE STUDIO ERA 39 (First Univ. of Minn. Press 2010) (1989) (describing 
how studios coordinated movie production with theatre operations). 
 70 See The Emergence of the Hollywood Studio System, supra note 67. 
 71 Id. (“Key to the studio system was the Big Eight’s domination of all areas 
of the industry.”). 
 72 Ken Orsatti, How SAG Was Founded: The Actor’s Road to Empowerment, 
SCREEN ACTORS GUILD (1995), http://www.sag.org/node/22. 
 73 See SCHATZ, supra note 69, at 42 (explaining that actors had “little control 
over their individual careers or their pictures”). 
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morals must be, even what political opinions to hold.”74 Indeed, 
movie studios exploited the personas of their actors by 
controlling the licensing of stars’ images to advertisers.75  
The studio system thrived on monopolistic practices.76 
Studios refused to poach each other’s actors.77 Collusive norms 
within the movie industry and the massive amount of control 
that the studios exacted over their actors allowed only rare 
commercial misappropriation of actors.78 
However, in 1948, the Supreme Court handed down a 
landmark decision in United States v. Paramount Pictures, 
Inc., which shocked the equilibrium within mass media. The 
Court held that the “Big Five” movie studios’ ownership of and 
dealings with theaters violated antitrust law.79 The courts 
ordered divestment from ownership of theaters80 and effectively 
ended the studio system.81 The studio RKO was the first to 
  
 74 Orsatti, supra note 72. 
 75 One notable example of the studios contracting their stars out for 
endorsements occurred in the tobacco industry. Given that the tobacco industry had a 
large national advertising budget, the studios placed their stars in “tie-ins,” where 
stars in tobacco ads sold both tobacco and new movies. K.L. Lum et al., Signed, Sealed 
and Delivered: “Big Tobacco” in Hollywood, 1927-1951, 17 TOBACCO CONTROL 313, 314 
(2008). The studios “maximize[d] marketing opportunities” through “[c]ross-promotion” 
advertisements that showcased tobacco products and big budget films together. Id. at 
321. While the studios controlled when and where advertisers could use the stars’ 
personas, these “campaigns also paid stars substantial sums while reinforcing the 
stars’ notoriety, boosting their value to the studios and other national advertisers.” Id. 
 76 See SCHATZ, supra note 69, at 9 (“The Hollywood studio system was, as 
economists and the federal courts well understood, a ‘mature-oligopoly’—a group of 
companies cooperating to control a certain market.”). For example, the studios engaged 
in block-booking with theaters, which is “the practice of licensing . . . one feature or 
group of features on condition that the exhibitor will also license another feature or 
group of features released by the distributors during a given period.” United States v. 
Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 156 (1948). In order to have the rights to show 
quality movies, the studios forced the theaters to buy lesser quality movies. SCHATZ, 
supra note 69, at 39 (describing how studios used block booking and blind bidding to 
forced theatre owners to run second rate movies in order to access “A-class features and 
star vehicles”). 
 77 Orsatti, supra note 72 (“As there was a tacit agreement among studios not 
to raid each other for a star[’]s services at their contracts end, actors were not able to 
choose their roles which is crucial in building a career.”). 
 78 Id.; see K.L. Lum et al., supra note 75, at 318 (“[S]tudio talent contracts 
gave studios complete control over the use of their celebrity ‘brand names’. Major 
studios negotiated the content of testimonials, insisted that the timing of adverts and 
radio appearances be coordinated with movie releases, and denied permission for deals 
that did not serve their interest.”). 
 79 Paramount, 334 U.S. at 141-61. 
 80 Id. at 175 (remanding the case to district court to determine whether 
divesture was necessary); United States v. Paramount, 85 F. Supp. 881, 899-900 
(S.D.N.Y. 1949) (ordering studios’ divestment from theaters). 
 81 See The Independent Producers and the Paramount Case, 1938-1949, SOC’Y OF 
INDEP. MOTION PICTURE PRODUCERS, http://www.cobbles.com/simpp_archive/paramountcase_ 
6supreme1948.htm (last visited Jan. 10, 2012). 
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break the vertical integration by divesting from theater 
ownership, and the others followed suit soon afterwards.82 As 
part of the movie industry’s restructuring, studios no longer 
hired actors in long-term contracts; instead, the studios hired 
actors per film.83 The actors became free agents.84 However 
ironically, actors no longer received the studios’ protection, 
which had long defended actors’ personas through collusive 
practices.85 As a result, entertainers needed a new form of 
protection to stop misappropriation of their most valuable 
assets: their identities. 
The invention of television brought additional instability. 
Actors feared that television stations would replay movies with 
impunity, resulting in fewer movie productions, less employment 
of screen actors, and diminution in value of personalities.86 One 
commentator explains, “By repeating episodes of favorite 
television programs and by airing old movies, television 
producers could squeeze additional revenue out of entertainment 
products with very little extra expenditure.”87 
Commodification of personality also occurred within 
professional athletics.88 Similar to the control that the studio 
system exacted over actors, the notion of amateurism regulated 
nineteenth-century athletes’ abilities to commodify their public 
persona.89 However, starting in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century, professional athletics allowed athletes to be 
  
 82 See id. 
 83 Emily C. Chi, Star Quality and Job Security: The Role of the Performers’ 
Unions in Controlling Access to the Acting Profession, 18 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 
31-33 (2000). 
 84 See SCHATZ, supra note 69, at 482 (“For top industry talent . . . declining 
studio control meant unprecedented freedom and opportunity.”). 
 85 See supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
 86 See Chi, supra note 83, at 35-36. Television, initially centered in New York, 
brought significant unemployment to the movie actors who were located in California. 
Id. at 35. 
 87 Id.  
 88 See Kristi Lee Covington Baker, A History of Sports Marketing and the 
Media 1 (Dec. 6, 2007) (unpublished M.S. thesis, Univ. of Kan.) (on file with author). 
 89 See Henry Yu, Tiger Woods at the Center of History: Looking Back at the 
Twentieth Century Through the Lenses of Race, Sports, and Mass Consumption, in 
SPORTS MATTERS: RACE, RECREATION, AND CULTURE, 320, 322 (John Bloom & Michael 
Nevin Willard eds., 2002) (“[A]mateur sports almost exclusively involved men of 
privilege whose wealth meant they did not have to exchange labor for money, and 
therefore their sporting activities were practices exempt from monetary transactions.”). 
For example, the Olympic Committee stripped Jim Thorpe of his gold medals in track 
after it became apparent that he had been compensated for playing in minor league 
baseball in the past. Covington Baker, supra note 88, at 13. 
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compensated for their performance.90 Starting in the 1920s, 
radio broadcasting within sports, particularly within baseball, 
communicated sports contests throughout the nation, as 
athletes became icons.91 Unlike actors under the studio system, 
professional athletes largely had control over licensing their 
personas.92 For example, Babe Ruth made approximately half 
his salary in endorsements during the 1920s and had a 
substantial effect on society given “the number of personal and 
radio appearances . . . as well as photo images and newspaper 
articles about him.”93 Given professional athletes’ personal 
control over the public’s perceptions of them, as opposed to 
actors who had ceded any rights to studios that were engaged 
in collusive activities, there was some demand for legal 
protection against misappropriating their personas. This can 
be seen in right of privacy cases, like Hanna v. Hillerich & 
Bradsby Co.94 and O’Brien v. Pabst Sales Co.,95 in which athletes 
argued invasion of privacy when their images had been 
misappropriated.96 Nevertheless, like for actors, the advent of 
the television brought about significant increase in athletes’ 
exposure to the American public, and with it an increased 
probability that their images would be misappropriated.97 Thus, 
although the need to protect athletes’ personas was addressed 
with the advent of professional sports, the demand for greater 
legal protection only increased with the invention of television. 
Athletes’ increased demand coincided with actors’ needs, as 
seen from the end of the studio era. 
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the 
nature of fame changed, which resulted in commodifying of 
identity. No rights existed to protect these new commodities, 
but the amount of control under the studio system made these 
rights moot. However, the remarkable changes to movie studio 
structuring and the advent of television quickly required new 
  
 90 See Covington Baker, supra note 88, at 6-7 (describing the compensation 
for professional football teams in the 1890’s). 
 91 Id. at 7-11. 
 92 See, e.g., id. at 10-11 (describing how Red Grange, a professional football 
player from the 1920s and 1930s, endorsed a number of products, including ginger ale, 
candy bars, and meatloaf). 
 93 Id. at 11. 
 94 78 F.2d 763 (5th Cir. 1935). 
 95 124 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1942). 
 96 See infra notes 117-21 and accompanying text. 
 97 Covington Baker, supra note 88, at 14-18. For example, Baseball Weekly 
ranked television “as the most important change in the game of baseball during the 
20th century, second only to Jackie Robinson’s breaking the color barrier.” Id. at 16. 
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rights. Both the right of publicity and patterns of collective 
bargaining in entertainment derive from a need for more 
protection of personalities in an age where image was valuable 
but no longer institutionally controlled. 
B. Right of Publicity as a Response 
The right of publicity can be seen as a direct legal 
response to the commodification of personality and 
technological change. Doctrinally, the right of publicity has its 
genesis in the right of privacy.98 Warren and Brandeis 
advocated for a new common law right of privacy, which 
protected the “right to be let alone.”99 William Prosser later 
famously divided privacy into four distinct torts that are 
generally recognized,100 but the only category that is relevant 
for the purposes of this note is the one that Prosser called 
“[a]ppropriation, for the defendant’s advantage, of the 
plaintiff’s name or likeness.”101 The right of privacy for 
misappropriation vindicates plaintiffs for mental distress, 
rather than commercial loss, resulting from unwillingly being 
placed in the public eye.102 
Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co.103 was the first 
case to test the right of privacy. The Franklin Mills Company, 
one of the defendants, placed a picture of Abigail Roberson, the 
plaintiff, on twenty-five thousand packages of flour without her 
consent.104 Roberson claimed that she suffered mental distress105 
and that the advertisement violated her right to privacy.106 The 
court refused to recognize a common law right of privacy, but 
  
 98 See, e.g., Dymond, supra note 23, at 449; Dogan & Lemley, supra note 5, at 
1167-68. 
 99 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 23, at 193. 
 100 William Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960) (“The law of 
privacy comprises four distinct kinds of invasion of four different interests of the 
plaintiff, which are tied together by the common name, but otherwise have almost 
nothing in common except that each represents an interference with the right of the 
plaintiff, in the phrase coined by Judge Cooley, ‘to be let alone.’”); 1 MCCARTHY, supra 
note 1, § 1:19 (“The courts have almost uniformly adopted Prosser’s four-part division 
as the ‘gospel’ of privacy law. Anyone who refuses to talk in Prosser’s language will 
meet blank stares of incomprehension.”). 
 101 Prosser, supra note 100, at 389. 
 102 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 1:7. 
 103 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902). 
 104 Id. at 442. 
 105 Id. (“[H]er good name has been attacked, causing her great distress and 
suffering, both in body and mind; that she was made sick, and suffered a severe 
nervous shock, was confined to her bed, and compelled to employ a physician, because 
of these facts . . . .”). 
 106 Id. at 443. 
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suggested that the legislature could enact a statute creating 
such a right.107 In response to Roberson, the New York State 
legislature passed section 50 of the N.Y. Civil Rights Law,108 
which proscribes using “name, portrait or picture of any living 
person without having first obtained the written consent” for 
advertising or trade purposes.109 
The Georgia Supreme Court broke with New York’s 
rejection of the common law right of privacy in Pavesich v. New 
England Life Ins. Co.110 Under facts similar to Roberson,111 the 
court concluded that there was a common law right of privacy112 
and that “[t]he novelty of the complaint is no objection, when an 
injury cognizable by law is shown to have been inflicted on the 
plaintiff.”113 Pavesich adopts several influential rules of law from 
Warren and Brandeis’s article that affected the development of 
publicity rights. First, the court recognized that public figures 
waive their rights of privacy to the extent that the information 
disclosed is relevant to the public interest.114 The court recited 
the example that a political candidate loses a certain degree of 
privacy in his or her private life because private information 
“may throw light upon his qualifications for the office, or the 
advisability of imposing upon him the public trust which the 
office carries.”115 Second, the court declared that the right of 
privacy is a personal right116 that is not assignable. 
With increasing acceptance of a privacy right for 
misappropriation, several plaintiffs unsuccessfully attempted 
to use privacy as a legal protection against misappropriating 
celebrities’ images. In essence, these claims sought damages for 
harm done to a professional persona rather than any actual 
mental distress suffered by the plaintiff. First, in Hanna 
  
 107 Id. (“The legislative body could very well interfere and arbitrarily provide 
that no one should be permitted for his own selfish purpose to use the picture or the 
name of another for advertising purposes without his consent.”). 
 108 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 1:16. 
 109 N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 51 (McKinney 2011). 
 110 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905). 
 111 See id. at 68-69 (suing for defendant’s use of picture in a newspaper 
advertisement without the plaintiff’s consent). 
 112 Id. at 78. 
 113 Id. at 69. 
 114 Id. at 72 (“The right of privacy, however, like every other right that rests in 
the individual, may be waived by him, or by any one authorized by him, or by any one 
whom the law empowers to act in his behalf, provided the effect of his waiver will not 
be such as to bring before the public those matters of a purely private nature which 
express law or public policy demands shall be kept private.”). 
 115 Id. 
 116 Id. at 73 (“It therefore follows from what has been said that a violation of 
the right of privacy is a direct invasion of a legal right of the individual.”). 
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Manufacturing Co. v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co., a bat 
manufacturer that had the exclusive rights to use the names 
and autographs of famous baseball players sued a competing 
bat manufacturer for using the same names on its bats.117 The 
court held, in part, that the plaintiffs had no right-to-privacy 
claim because the baseball players’ names were not property 
capable of assignment;118 therefore, the plaintiff gained no 
property right from the exclusive contract and had no cause of 
action against the infringers.119 Second, in O’Brien v. Pabst 
Sales Co., a famous college football player sued a beer 
manufacturer for placing his picture in their promotional 
calendar without consent.120 The court held that the right of 
privacy did not apply because the plaintiff waived his privacy 
rights regarding his football career as a public figure.121 Hanna 
and O’Brien, respectively, illustrate two major deficiencies in 
the right of privacy when it comes to protecting publicity 
rights: (1) public waiver of privacy, as seen in O’Brien, and (2) 
the nonassignability of personality traits, as seen in Hanna.  
Despite several attempts to transform privacy into a 
legal protection for celebrities’ persona, the legal system 
recognized a right of publicity only after the immense changes 
in technology, such as the advent of television and the end of 
the studio system within the entertain industry.122 In Haelan 
Laboratories v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc.,123 a case with eerily 
similar facts to Hanna,124 Judge Frank of the Second Circuit 
was the first to recognize a right to protect commercial value of 
personality.125 Judge Frank was well aware of the 
commodification of persona and the significant structural 
changes within the entertainment industry, as he wrote:  
This right might be called a “right of publicity.” For it is common 
knowledge that many prominent persons (especially actors and ball-
players), far from having their feelings bruised through public exposure 
of their likenesses, would feel sorely deprived if they no longer received 
  
 117 Hanna Mfg. Co. v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co., 78 F.2d 763, 764 (5th Cir. 1935). 
 118 Id. at 766. 
 119 Id. at 766-67. 
 120 O’Brien v. Pabst Sales Co., 124 F.2d 167, 168 (5th Cir. 1942). 
 121 Id. at 170. 
 122 See supra Part I.A. 
 123 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953). 
 124 Like the bat manufactures in Hanna, in Haelan, a gum manufacturer sued a 
rival gum manufacturer for inducing a baseball player, who had an exclusive contract with 
the plaintiff, to allow the defendant to use the player’s image in advertisements. Id. at 867. 
 125 Id. at 868. 
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money for authorizing advertisements, popularizing their countenances, 
displayed in newspapers, magazines, busses, trains and subways.126 
Academics of the era defended the newly created right 
of publicity and provided a more elaborate justification. In his 
law review article The Right of Publicity,127 Melville B. Nimmer 
argued that the right of privacy “is not adequate to meet the 
demands of the second half of the twentieth century, 
particularly with respect to the advertising, motion picture, 
television, and radio industries.”128 His specific concern for the 
entertainment industry shows that the right of publicity was 
supposed to address not only the commodification of persona, 
but also the significant technological and structural changes in 
the entertainment industry. 
C. Collective Bargaining Agreements as a Response 
The right of publicity was not the exclusive response to 
the commodification of personality and rapidly improving 
technology. Entertainment collective bargaining agreements 
also sought to protect actors from misappropriation of their 
commercial images. Unions in the entertainment industry 
existed long before the 1950s.129 Under the studio system, which 
provided relatively stable employment,130 workers formed unions 
to guarantee standardized wages131 and working conditions.132 
The unions’ jurisdiction divided along profession. Each position 
within the industry had its own craft union.133 For example, the 
  
 126 Id. 
 127 Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
203 (1954). 
 128 Id. (emphasis added). 
 129 For example, Actors’ Equity Association, which represents theater actors, 
started in the early twentieth century, and was recognized by the American Federation of 
Labor in 1919. Historical Overview, ACTORS’ EQUITY ASS’N, http://www.actorsequity.org/ 
aboutequity/historicaloverview.asp (last visited Jan. 10, 2010). 
 130 Alan Paul & Archie Kleingartner, Flexible Production and the 
Transformation of Industrial Relations in the Motion Picture and Television Industry, 
47 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 663, 666 (1994). 
 131 See DAVID F. PRINDLE, THE POLITICS OF GLAMOUR: IDEOLOGY AND 
DEMOCRACY IN THE SCREEN ACTORS GUILD 16-25 (1988) (describing how SAG was 
formed following a significant pay cut in 1933). 
 132 See Orsatti, supra note 72 (suggesting that SAG gained better working 
conditions for actors under the studio system, but “the studios still basically ‘owned’ 
their stars”). 
 133 See Paul & Kleingartner, supra note 130, at 666 (“DGA represents all 
directors, whether in film or videotape production; WGA has jurisdiction over writers, 
including most news writers; SAG and the American Federation of Television and 
Radio Artists (AFTRA) represent all performers except instrumental musicians, who 
are represented by the American Federation of Musicians . . . .”). 
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American Federation of Radio Artists, the precursor to AFTRA, 
started as a representative of radio performers,134 and SAG 
represented actors in movies and later television.135 
After the collapse of the studio system and the advent of 
new technology, actors faced less demand for their services and 
massive unemployment.136 Two technological advances at that 
time were particularly important. First, starting in the early 
1940s, radio gained the ability to record and rerun radio 
shows.137 Second, starting in the 1950s, television began 
rerunning programming and movies on television.138 Both of 
these practices reduced the number of productions while 
continuing to expose the performers to the public at large, 
thereby diminishing the value of the actors’ personas. 
To address these issues, unions compromised. Following 
the demise of the studio system, performers’ unions no longer 
fought for job security.139 Instead, the unions focused on 
increasing the wages and working conditions of their rank-and-
file members when they actually had work.140 To do so, the 
unions negotiated for a three-tier compensation system,141 
  
 134 History, AM. FED. TELEVISION & RADIO ARTISTS (July 13, 2009), 
http://www.aftra.org/history.htm.  
 135 PRINDLE, supra note 131, at 3 (“The guild is a labor union composed of 
actors who have performed in feature motion pictures, television series, television 
commercials, and industrial and educational films.”). 
 136 Chi, supra note 83, at 33 (“Consequently, many actors were set adrift from 
the studios and, faced for the first time with uncertain professional futures . . . .”).  
 137 Matt Jackson, Residuals, MUSEUM BROAD. COMM., http://www.museum.tv/ 
eotvsection.php?entrycode=residuals (last visited Jan. 10, 2012). Residuals payable to 
unions date as far back as the 1920s for phonograph recording. Paul & Kleingartner, supra 
note 130, at 669. However, scholars generally recognize the 1941 American Federation of 
Radio Artists’ (AFRA) Transcription Code as the first instance of performers receiving 
residual payments for reuse of radio programming. Id.; see also Jackson, supra. 
 138 Paul & Kleingartner, supra note 130, at 669; see also PRINDLE, supra note 
131, at 82 (“As the 1950s advanced, it became clear to the networks that filmed television 
was superior to live. For one thing, film could be shown at the same time in each time 
zone. For another, it could record a performance on one day and be broadcast on another. 
Moreover, film could be saved and reshown, thus generating revenue many times, 
whereas once a live performance was over it and its earnings were gone forever.”). 
 139 See Chi, supra note 83, at 34 (describing how the union became a 
mechanism of “monitoring and restricting access to acting work”); see also PRINDLE, 
supra note 131, at 11 (“One of the major functions of a union—providing its members 
with job security—is therefore forbidden.”). 
 140 See Chi, supra note 83, at 27 (“Together, the above-the-line entertainment 
unions, including but not limited to SAG and AEA, estimate that ninety to ninety-five 
percent of their members are unemployed on any given day. . . . Although the talent unions 
have secured higher wages and more humane working conditions for their members, a union 
card cannot guarantee employment.” (emphasis added)); see also Mission Statement, 
SCREEN ACTORS GUILD, http://www.sag.org/about-us/mission-statement (last visited Feb. 16, 
2012) (“The Guild exists to enhance actors’ working conditions, compensation and benefits 
and to be a powerful, unified voice on behalf of artists’ rights.”). 
 141 Paul & Kleingartner, supra note 130, at 667. 
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which still exists today.142 First, all actors receive minimum 
wage rates.143 The minimum wage rates compensate actors for 
time spent working on a project,144 and compensate directors 
and writers for products delivered.145 Second, personal service-
contracts provisions within the collective bargaining 
agreements allow individuals to negotiate outside of the 
collective bargaining compensation scale, provided that the 
wages are higher than the contract scale.146 These allow well-
known or high-quality actors, writers, and directors to demand 
more for their services.147 Third, and most importantly, actors 
receive residual payments. Residual payments are 
supplemental payments to actors for reuse of “entertainment 
product in media other than the one for which it was originally 
created, or for its reuse within the same medium subsequent to 
the initial exhibition.”148 
Residual payments first appeared in 1941 when radio 
introduced recording technology.149 Prior to this advancement, 
radio performers presented their program multiple times per 
day—at least once on the East Coast and once on the West 
Coast.150 Since the performers were paid per performance, had 
the American Federation of Artists not secured residual 
payments, compensation would have been cut in half without 
supplemental payment for the programming’s reuse.151 Residuals 
emerged next in television. SAG secured residual payments for 
its members for rerunning television programs in 1952,152 for 
repeated use of television commercials in 1953, and for movies 
reformatted and aired on television in 1960.153 Residuals 
  
 142 See infra Part II.B.2 (describing how the same three-tier compensation 
system still operates under the current Commercials Contract). 
 143 Paul & Kleingartner, supra note 130, at 667 (detailing how entertainment 
contracts “contain[] a minimum compensation schedule”). 
 144 Id. (describing how entertainment contracts calculate actors’, singers’, and 
stunt players’ minimum rates based on either a day rate, week rate, or a rate for a 
specified term). 
 145 Id. 
 146 Id. at 668. 
 147 Id. at 669 (“Personal service contracts provide for the exchange of scarce, 
differentiable, and perishable talent.”). 
 148 Id.; see also PRINDLE, supra note 131, at 82 (describing how residual 
payments became a necessity to actors’ economic survival after movies could be 
replayed on television, as “[a]ctors discovered that they were competing with their 
former selves for jobs, and losing”).  
 149 Jackson, supra note 137.  
 150 Id. 
 151 Id. 
 152 Id.; Orsatti, supra note 72. 
 153 Orsatti, supra note 72. 
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expanded to nearly all collective bargaining agreements in the 
entertainment industry, including writers and directors.154 
Not all performers that work under entertainment 
contracts receive residual payments. Under the standard union 
contracts, only those whose professional personas are exploited 
by reuse are paid residuals. In film, television, and television 
commercials, only principal actors receive residual payments; 
extras are entitled only to minimum payments.155 Even writers 
represented by the Writers’ Guild of America (WGA) receive 
residual payments for screenplays only when they are given 
screen credit.156 Given this set of circumstances, the residual 
payments represent more than a deferral in compensation to 
offset long periods of unemployment; to fulfill that justification, 
they would have to extend to everyone in the industry. Instead, 
residuals compensate workers for dilution of their professional-
persona value by exploiting reuse of contractually bound 
material. The emergence of residual payments, like the right of 
publicity, was a reaction to the commodification of identity and 
advancing technology, but within the contractual relationship 
rather than the world at large. 
II. HOW THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY AND COLLECTIVE 
BARGAINING PROTECT AGAINST MISUSE OF PERSONA 
Thus far, this note has established that the right of 
publicity and patterns in collective bargaining in the 
entertainment industry arose from the same historical context. In 
the entertainment industry, the right of publicity and collective 
bargaining agreements also both operate to protect actors against 
misappropriation of their personas. This section will draw upon 
the AFTRA/SAG Television Commercials Contracts with the 
ANA/AAA (Commercials Contracts) to illustrate how collective 
bargaining agreements afford these protections. 
A. Scope of the Rights 
Both the right of publicity and the Commercials 
Contracts are limited in scope. However, a brief analysis of 
  
 154 See Paul & Kleingartner, supra note 130, at 671 (describing how residuals 
are calculated under various collective bargaining contracts). 
 155 Robert W. Gilbert, “Residual Rights” Established by Collective Bargaining 
in Television and Radio, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 102, 107 (1958). 
 156 Id. at 108. 
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where and upon whom they apply will show that both are 
disproportionately influential on the media industry.  
1. The Scope of the Right of Publicity 
The right of publicity is a state law doctrine recognized 
in approximately nineteen states by statute.157 Twenty-one 
states recognize a common law right of publicity,158 eight of 
which also have a statute.159 Therefore, thirty-one states have 
explicitly recognized the right of publicity. The protections 
afforded under the right of publicity vary from state to state. 
While the number of states that recognize the right of publicity 
is limited, the right’s effect on media is enormous because the 
largest and most media-concentrated states accept it. In 
particular, one writer points to California, New York, and 
Tennessee as the states “whose economies are impacted the 
most by the entertainment industry.”160 
2. Scope of the Commercials Contracts 
The Commercials Contracts are collective bargaining 
agreements between actors’ unions and the advertising 
industry. The Joint Policy Committee for Broadcast Talent 
Relations (JPC) represents advertising management in 
negotiations.161 JPC is a multi-employer bargaining unit 
  
 157 See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 6:8 (identifying California, Florida, 
Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Nebraska, Nevada, New York, Ohio, 
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, 
Washington, and Wisconsin as recognizing right of publicity by statute); see also Hunt, 
supra note 23, at 1607 n.20 (listing eighteen states, but excluding Pennsylvania which 
passed its statute after the publication of Hunt’s article). 
 158 See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 6:3 (identifying Alabama, Arizona, 
California, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Kentucky, Michigan, 
Minnesota, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South 
Carolina, Texas, Utah, West Virginia, and Wisconsin as recognizing right of publicity 
through common law). 
 159 See id. § 6:3 nn.7-8 (identifying California, Florida, Illinois, Kentucky, Ohio, 
Pennsylvania, Texas, and Wisconsin as having both a common law and statutory right). 
 160 Dymond, supra note 23, at 448. 
 161 See Memorandum from Douglas J. Wood, ANA-AAAA Joint Policy Comm. on 
Broad. Talent Union Relations, Unions and the Prod. of Commercials for Traditional and 
Non-Traditional Media 1 (Jan. 28, 2009), available at http://www.adlawbyrequest.com/ 
uploads/file/Why%20be%20an%20Authorizer.pdf (“The JPC is the multi-employer 
bargaining unit that represents the interests of the advertising industry in negotiations 
with the various unions that represent performers and musicians who perform 
commercials . . . . The JPC is comprised of thirty members—fifteen appointed by the 
Association of National Advertisers and fifteen appointed by the American Association of 
Advertising Agencies. The ANA also appoints the JPC Lead Negotiator and legal counsel.”). 
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comprising the Association of National Advertisers (ANA)162 and 
the American Association of Advertising Agencies (AAAA).163 
JPC negotiates the collective bargaining agreements jointly 
with the Screen Actors Guild (SAG) and the American 
Federation of Television and Radio Artists (AFTRA).164  
The Commercials Contracts deal exclusively with 
advertisements on television, Internet, radio, and new media, 
such as video advertisements on cellular phones.165 The 
contracts do not bind non-union employers, and do not cover 
photography for print advertising.166 Like the right of publicity, 
the Commercials Contracts are limited in scope but influential 
on the advertising industry. Advertisers produce 90 percent of 
television commercials under the Commercials Contracts,167 
which totals approximately $1 billion in compensation to 
unionized performers.168 
  
 162 The ANA is a trade organization for companies that advertise. It represents 
more than four hundred companies and ten thousand brands, which spend more than 
$250 billion on advertising and marketing annually. About the ANA: Leading the 
Marketing Community, ASS’N NAT’L ADVERTISERS, http://www.ana.net/about (last visited 
Jan. 11, 2012).  
 163 AAAA is a national trade organization for advertising agencies. Its 
members produce approximately 80 percent of all advertisements within the United 
States annually. Join Us, AM. ASS’N ADVERTISING AGENCIES, http://www.aaaa.org/ 
about/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Jan. 11, 2012). 
 164 See Wood, supra 161, at 1. 
 165 See 2003 Commercials Contract, Screen Actors Guild and the ANA-AAAA 
Joint Policy Committee on Broadcast Talent Relations §§ 4-5, as amended by Screen 
Actors Guild 2006-2008 Extension to the Commercials Contract Memorandum of 
Agreement §§ 2, 6, as amended by Screen Actors Guild 2009 Commercials Memorandum 
of Agreement §§ 9-10 [hereinafter SAG Commercials Contract]; 2003 AFTRA Television 
Recorded Commercials Contract, American Federation of Television and Radio Artists, 
Association of National Advertisers, and American Association of Advertising Agencies 
Joint Policy Committee on Broadcast Talent Relations § I(1)(B), as amended by American 
Federation of Television and Radio Artists 2006-2008 Extension to the Television 
Recorded Commercials Contract Memorandum of Agreement § 5, as amended by 
American Federation of Television and Radio Artists 2009 Television Recorded 
Commercials Contract Memorandum of Agreement §§ 9-10 [hereinafter AFTRA 
Commercials Contract]. All documents related to both SAG’s and AFTRA’s Commercials 
Contracts are available at http://www.adlawbyrequest.com/articles/unions/. 
 166 See SAG Commercials Contract, supra note 165, § 5 (limiting scope of 
contract to commercials); id. § 4 (defining “commercials” as “short advertising or 
commercial messages made as motion pictures, 3 minutes or less in length, and 
intended for showing over television” (emphasis added)); AFTRA Commercials 
Contract, supra note 165, §§ 1(B), 4(A) (same). 
 167 Jack Neff, Industry Explores New Compensation Model for $1 Billion in 
Commercial Talent Fees, ADVERTISING AGE (May 3, 2010), http://adage.com/article/ 
news/industry-explores-compensation-model-talent-fees/143638/. 
 168 Wood, supra note 161, at 1. 
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B. The Nature of the Right 
Both the right of publicity and the Commercials 
Contracts create a framework for individuals to control their 
personas within commercials. The significant difference 
between the two is that the Commercials Contracts protect 
against misuse by the other party to the agreement, whereas 
the right of publicity protects against the world at large. 
1. The Nature of the Right of Publicity 
The right of publicity is “the inherent right of every 
human being to control the commercial use of his or her 
identity.”169 It protects the plaintiff from unauthorized 
commercial use that causes damage to the commercial value of 
his or her persona.170 The right of publicity treats personality as 
property that the owner can exclude others from using for 
commercial gain.171 As a result, unlike the right of privacy, 
publicity rights are fully assignable.172 Furthermore, many 
states allow a performer’s right of publicity to pass to that 
performer’s heirs.173 Remedies for an infringement of the right 
of publicity include an injunction against future use, statutory 
damages, compensatory damages, disgorgement of profits, 
punitive damages, and attorney’s fees.174 Therefore, the right of 
  
 169 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 1:3. 
 170 Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 573 (1977) (“[T]he 
State’s interest in permitting a ‘right of publicity’ is in protecting the proprietary 
interest of the individual . . . .”); see also 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 3:2 (“Likely 
damage to commercial value is a hallmark of the right of publicity, distinguishing it 
from the various types of ‘privacy’ rights. However, this is not to state that evidence of 
some quantifiable commercial damage is an essential element of proof of liability for 
infringement of the right of publicity.” (footnote omitted)). 
 171 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (1995) (“One who 
appropriates the commercial value of a person’s identity by using without consent the 
person’s name, likeness, or other indicia of identity for purposes of trade is subject to 
liability . . . .”); id. at cmt. g (“The interest in the commercial value of a person’s identity is 
in the nature of a property right . . . .”); see also 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 22, § 10:7. 
 172 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46, cmt. g (“[T]he 
commercial value of a person’s identity is . . . freely assignable to others.”). 
 173 Some states allow estates to enforce the right of publicity for a limited 
number of years after death. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344.1(g) (West Supp. 2012) 
(granting the estate the right of publicity for up to seventy years after death). Other 
states grant the estate a right of publicity for a minimum number of years followed by 
a right in perpetuity, which permits enforcement for as long as the estate continues to 
exploit the persona commercially. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-1104 (2001) (granting 
the estate a minimum right for ten years, and a right in perpetuity that extinguishes 
after two years of disuse). 
 174 See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 22, §§ 11:21-11:38. 
2012] RIGHT OF PUBLICITY 1155 
publicity is a guarantee of control over the commercial use of 
one’s persona against the world at large. 
Since the right of publicity derives from state law, the 
amount of protection varies from state to state.175 Nearly every 
state that recognizes the right protects against at least the 
unauthorized use of name and likeness.176 For example, New 
York, which recognizes only a statutory right and not a common 
law right,177 protects against the unauthorized use of “name, 
portrait, picture or voice.”178 Other states provide for a wider 
array of uses that may damage the commercial value of 
persona.179 For instance, California’s statutory right protects 
against “knowingly us[ing] another’s name, voice, signature, 
photograph, and likeness.”180 California’s common law protects 
further against additional types of use, including mannerism, 
characterizations, and performing style.181 
Additionally, the right of publicity is limited by the 
context in which the use takes place. States place particular 
constraints on the context of the usage within their statutes or 
common law. These constraints exist to comply with First 
Amendment free speech, press, and expression, as well as to 
prevent the doctrine from stifling cultural exchange in 
society.182 For example, in New York, in order for unauthorized 
use to be an infringement, it has to be either for advertising or 
trade purposes.183 Courts broadly interpret advertising purposes 
to include usage in solicitation to buy products or services.184 
Trade purposes are uses that draw attention to the defendant’s 
business, but do not directly solicit.185 Furthermore, New York 
  
 175 See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 6:8. 
 176 See, e.g., id. (listing that every statutorily recognized right of publicity 
protects against the unauthorized use of name and likeness). 
 177 Stephano v. News Grp. Publ’ns, Inc., 474 N.E.2d. 580, 584 (N.Y. 1985) 
(ruling that the right of privacy is statutory, and there is no common law cause of 
action in New York). 
 178 Dymond, supra 23, at 447.  
 179 See, e.g., White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc. 971 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir. 
1991) (holding under California law that a robot in a commercial that was made to 
resemble Vanna White infringed on her common law right of publicity); 
Motschenbacher v. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821, 825-27 (9th Cir. 1974) (holding 
under California law that using a car that looked similar to the plaintiff’s racing car 
infringed on his right of publicity). 
 180 CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(a) (West 1997).  
 181 Dymond, supra note 23, at 464-65. 
 182 See Hunt, supra note 23, at 1629-39 (discussing restrictions on media and 
commercial speech). 
 183 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 6:86. 
 184 Id. 
 185 Id. 
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exempts certain uses without the subject’s consent, including 
use within the news,186 and incidental uses.187 
2. The Nature of Persona Rights Under the 
Commercials Contracts 
Like the right of publicity, the Commercials Contracts 
allow principal performers control over the use of their 
persona, but within the confines of a contractual relationship. 
A number of specific contractual provisions demonstrate the 
nature and limit of this control.  
First, and most importantly, the compensation structure 
protects performers from damage to the commercial value of 
their personas by placing a supplemental price on use of the 
commercial. All performers are entitled to session fees of varying 
amounts depending on their role within the production.188 
Session fees represent the minimum compensation within the 
three-tier structure implemented by the union.189 Principal 
performers, as opposed to extras,190 are central to the purpose of 
the commercial; their personas are used and identifiable within 
the commercial.191 As a result, the Contract gives additional 
compensation to principal performers in the form of holding fees 
and residual compensation. 
  
 186 Id. § 6:93 (“[T]here is no doubt that there is no statutory liability for 
distribution and syndication of a general interest television news program which shows 
a film of the plaintiff as part of a newsworthy report.”). The First Amendment places 
additional limits on the right of publicity. See supra note 22. However, New York’s 
statutory scheme prohibits newsworthy uses in advertising material. See 1 MCCARTHY, 
supra note 1, § 6:89 (“The fact that newsworthy information also appears in a context 
that clearly advertises a product or service does not immunize what would otherwise be 
a violation of the statutory right.”). 
 187 Id. § 6:90 (“New York recognizes an ‘incidental use’ exception from 
statutory liability for insignificant or fleeting usages of persona that have no real 
commercial significance.”). 
 188 See SAG Commercials Contract, supra note 165, § 20 (“Producer shall pay 
principal performers the following rates per 8-hour day which shall also constitute 
payment for the first commercial made for one designated advertiser . . . .” (emphasis 
added)); AFTRA Commercials Contract, supra note 165, § 20 (same); SAG Commercials 
Contract, supra note 165, sch. D, § 6 (detailing minimum rates for extras); AFTRA 
Commercials Contract, supra note 165, sch. C, § 2 (same). 
 189 See supra note 143-45 and accompanying text. 
 190 See infra Part IV.B (discussing the distinction between principal 
performers and extras, and how that distinction relates to the incidental use doctrine 
within the right of publicity). 
 191 SAG Commercials Contract, supra note 165, § 6 (listing the types of uses 
that constitute principal performers, including speaking lines or silent appearance of a 
face that can be identified with a product); AFTRA Commercials Contract, supra note 
165, § 6 (same). 
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Holding fees are payments from the advertiser to the 
principal performer for each thirteen-week cycle that the 
advertisement airs.192 The session fee constitutes the holding fee 
for the first thirteen-week cycle,193 but subsequent cycles 
require payment of a holding fee equal to the original session 
fee.194 An advertiser’s failure to pay holding fees voids its right 
to use the commercial.195 Ultimately, holding fees place a price 
on airing commercials over an extended period, and 
compensate actors for damage done to their commercial value 
when advertisements are aired over a long period of time. 
Traditionally, residual payments paid performers for 
each reuse of the commercial within the thirteen-week cycle.196 
But under the contract, which is the product of over fifty years 
of negotiation,197 the exact calculation for residuals varies 
depending on the television channel and the geographic reach 
of the commercial broadcast. For example, Class A 
commercials, which run on traditional networks like NBC and 
air in sufficient locations, receive payments every time the 
commercial airs.198 Cable commercials, on the other hand, 
compensate principal performers with residual payments for 
only the first two thousand airings.199 To fix anomalies, the 
advertising industry has proposed calculating residuals across 
all television programming based on gross rating points (GRP) 
  
 192 SAG Commercials Contract, supra note 165, § 31; AFTRA Commercials 
Contract, supra note 165, § 31. 
 193 SAG Commercials Contract, supra note 165, § 31(c) (“The session fee shall 
be deemed the holding fee payable for the first fixed cycle.”); AFTRA Commercials 
Contract, supra note 165, § 31(c) (same). 
 194 SAG Commercials Contract, supra note 165, § 31(b) (“[U]pon the 
commencement of each consecutive fixed cycle thereafter throughout the maximum 
permissible period of use or any extension thereof, a principal performer shall be paid a 
separate fee, herein called the holding fee, in an amount equal to a session fee . . . .”); 
AFTRA Commercials Contract, supra note 165, § 31(b) (same). 
 195 SAG Commercials Contract, supra note 165, § 31(e) (“If Producer fails to 
pay the holding fee on or before the date on which it is due . . . all further right of 
Producer to use the commercial shall cease and terminate, and the principal performer 
shall thereupon be automatically released from all contractual obligations with respect 
to the commercial.”); AFTRA Commercials Contract, supra note 165, § 31(e) (same). 
 196 Susan Shelley, The Screen Actors Guild and the Commercials Strike of 
1978-79 (1979) (research paper), available at http://www.extremeink.com/strike.htm 
(last visited Jan. 13, 2012) (“Actors, in other words, would receive continuing payments 
as long as their work was being used to generate revenue for an advertiser.”). 
 197 Neff, supra note 167 (“The current system is based on a model first 
developed in the 1950s . . . .”); see also Shelley, supra note 196 (describing that the 
general terms of the SAG Commercials Contract date back to the 1950’s). 
 198 SAG Commercials Contract, supra note 165, § 34(a)-(b); AFTRA 
Commercials Contract, supra note 165, § 34(a)-(b). 
 199 SAG Commercials Contract, supra note 165, § 35(c); AFTRA Commercials 
Contract, supra note 165, § 35(c). 
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rather than a pay-per-use standard.200 In effect, advertisers 
would pay residuals based on the number of viewers that saw 
the commercial rather than the number of times the 
commercial aired.201 Additionally, similar to states that allow a 
descendible right of publicity, the heirs of principal performers 
are entitled to residuals postmortem.202 In this sense, the 
residuals are analogous to a property right rather than a 
typical contractual right. 
Regardless of how the contract calculates residuals, they 
represent more than mere supplemental compensation. Legally, 
despite several attempts to treat residuals as a form of 
property,203 the law treats them as supplemental compensation.204 
Indeed, residuals account for the largest proportion of 
compensation under the Commercials Contracts.205 Performers 
often survive long periods of unemployment through residuals, 
as they are deferred compensation.206 Economically, however, 
residuals play a larger role than typical deferred compensation. 
Residual payments protect principal performers against 
overexposure by placing a price on the advertiser for every use of 
  
 200 See Neff, supra note 167 (“There can be anomalies in cable buys where the 
media costs less than the talent . . . . We hope to switch to the same GRPs and ROI 
measurement we use for other media and 99% of the dollars spent, so the tail will no 
longer be wagging the dog.” (quoting Douglas Wood)). During the 2009 negotiations, 
the parties agreed to retain a consulting firm to assess the feasibility of the proposal, 
and to start the 2012 negotiations early to devote time to consider the proposal. SAG 
Commercials Contract, supra note 165, § 21(a). 
 201 See BOOZ ALLEN HAMILTON, TALENT COMPENSATION FINAL STEERING 
COMMITTEE MEETING 24 (2007), available at http://www.adlawbyrequest.com/uploads/ 
file/Talent%20Compensation%20Final%20Update_12192007_main%20document.pdf.  
 202 Estates, SCREEN ACTORS GUILD, http://www.sag.org/content/estates (last 
visited Jan. 13, 2012) (“As you may know, residual payments are made in perpetuity 
(as long as a project is being exhibited somewhere in the world). Residuals are 
considered property (similar to a piece of artwork) and can be passed through a last 
will and testament and/or a living trust.”). 
 203 See, e.g., Gilbert, supra note 155, at 112 n.15 (“§ XXVII of the 1955 Filmed 
Commercials contract, which provides that ‘The right of a player to compensation for 
the use and re-use of a commercial shall be a vested property right and shall not be 
affected by the expiration of this contract or by any act on the part of the 
Producer.’”(emphasis added)). 
 204 See id. at 104 (“From a legal standpoint, the importance of recognizing that 
these residuals are a type of wage payment cannot be stressed too greatly.”); Paul & 
Kleingartner, supra note 130, at 672 (“In the 1950’s, residuals were seen purely as a 
mechanism to compensate workers for lost work and over-exposure.”). 
 205 See REPORT ON THE PROGRESS OF COMMERCIALS MONITORING DURING THE 
TERM OF THE SAG/AFTRA 2000 COMMERCIALS CONTRACT 2 (2003), available at 
http://www.sag.org/files/sag/documents/Report%20on%20Progress%20-%20Comm% 
20Monitoring_0.pdf (citing that residuals comprised of 66 percent of actors’ payments 
under the 1998-2002 SAG Commercials Contract).  
 206 See Paul & Kleingartner, supra note 130, at 672 (“[Residuals] cushion the 
impact of unemployment, especially among the neophytes who suffer long periods of 
unemployment . . . .”). 
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the commercial.207 Paul and Kleingartner explain, “Residuals 
reconcile that divergence of interests by specifying cash 
compensation for the presumed devaluation of future work via 
present-day overexposure.”208 Additionally, expanding residuals 
into new media forms maintains an adequate level of 
compensation when new technology reduces the demand for 
performers’ services.209 Therefore, like the right of publicity, 
residuals provide compensation to actors for damage done to 
their commercial personas.  
The Commercials Contracts provide principal 
performers with other means of control beyond compensation. 
The Contracts limit producers’ power to use principal 
performers’ work to only agreed-upon commercials.210 If a 
producer uses a performer’s work in another commercial, the 
performer is entitled to liquidated damages equal to three 
session payments and usage fees, as well as residual fees that 
would be due had the performer consented to the use.211 
Additionally, a performer has the option to arbitrate with or 
  
 207 Section 1(a) of the SAG Commercials Contract states that principal 
performers receive residual compensation because: 
[A] principal performer rendering services in a commercial performs, to a 
great extent, the duties of a demonstrator or salesperson of a particular 
product or service and as such, tends to be identified with that particular 
product or service . . . . [T]his identification increases proportionately with 
the continued telecasting of a commercial . . . . [A]dvertisers and their 
agencies seldom approve the employment of a principal performer who has 
become identified with another product or service, especially if the product or 
service is competitive. These conditions and practices tend to reduce 
opportunities for further employment in this field. 
 208 Paul & Kleingartner, supra note 130, at 672. 
 209 Id. at 671 (“The single most important factor in the growth of residual 
compensation has been the expansion of residual obligations to new entertainment markets.”). 
 210 SAG Commercials Contract, supra note 165, § 17(a)-(b) (“The rights 
granted to Producer in commercials shall be limited to the right to use, distribute, 
reproduce and/or exhibit such commercials over television . . . . Producer agrees that no 
part of the photography or sound track of a principal performer made for a commercial 
shall be used other than in commercials as provided hereunder without separately 
bargaining with the principal performer and reaching an agreement regarding such 
use.”); AFTRA Commercials Contract, supra note 165, § 17(a)-(b) (same). But the 
contracts provide exceptions that producers can use the “name and likeness of the 
principal performer and his/her acts, poses and appearances . . . for the purpose of 
publicizing the business of the Producer.” SAG Commercials Contract, supra note 165, 
§ 17(a); AFTRA Commercials Contract, supra note 165, § 17(a). This exception allows 
the advertising agencies, photographers and directors to show the content of their work 
to prospective clients without violating the contract.  
 211 SAG Commercials Contract, supra note 165, § 17(b); AFTRA Commercials 
Contract, supra note 165, § 17(b). 
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sue a producer rather than accepting liquidated damages 
provided within the Commercials Contracts.212 
Finally, the Commercials Contracts create options for 
principal performers to limit the maximum length an advertiser 
can run a commercial to twenty-one months.213 However, 
principal performers waive this right if they fail to give written 
notification of their desire to cease running the commercial.214 
Both the right of publicity and the Commercials 
Contracts provide actors ways to control the usage of their 
images within advertising. The right of publicity prevents 
unauthorized usage and compensates for damage done to the 
commercial value of actors’ personas. The Commercials 
Contracts give actors some control over the usage of their 
images in voluntary relations with advertisers, and compensate 
for commercial devaluation of their personas via residuals and 
holding fees. Given these analogous functions, the Commercials 
Contracts are an apt benchmark for comparison when 
considering both the policy justifications and doctrinal rules 
within the right of publicity.  
III. ANALYZING THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY’S POLICY 
JUSTIFICATIONS BY REFERENCE TO THE COMMERCIALS 
CONTRACTS 
Justifying the right of publicity has sparked significant 
debate among scholars, as it “is both hard to object to and hard 
to support.”215 Having a compelling policy justification for the 
right of publicity is essential for two reasons. First, it provides 
a general rationale for the right of publicity’s existence. Second, 
policy justifications affect how judges and legislators shape the 
rules and doctrines within the right of publicity. Adopting a 
flawed policy justification can lead to illogical doctrine and 
  
 212 SAG Commercials Contract, supra note 165, § 17(b); AFTRA Commercials 
Contract, supra note 165, § 17(b). 
 213 SAG Commercials Contract, supra note 165, § 30(a) (“[T]he maximum 
period during which a commercial may be used shall be not more than [twenty-one] 
months after the date of commencement of the first fixed cycle . . . .”); AFTRA 
Commercials Contract, supra note 165, § 30(a) (same). 
 214 SAG Commercials Contract, supra note 165, § 30(d); AFTRA Commercials 
Contract, supra note 165, § 30(d). The performer must give the advertiser written 
notification no earlier than sixty days before, and no later than 120 days after the 
twenty-first month of use. SAG Commercials Contract, supra note 165, § 30(d); AFTRA 
Commercials Contract, supra note 165, § 30(d). 
 215 David Westfall & David Landau, Publicity Rights as Property Rights, 23 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 71, 122 (2005). 
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inequitable consequences.216 The Commercials Contracts—with 
their common origin and similar protections to the right of 
publicity—can be used as a tool to analyze the merits of 
frequently asserted policy justifications for the right of 
publicity. This section concludes that any analogy to copyright 
or trademark217 fails in light of policy analysis and actual 
business custom. Instead, unjust enrichment and natural 
rights best explain the right of publicity. 
A. Economic Incentives, Labor Theory, and Copyright 
A common justification for the right of publicity is that 
it incentivizes creative endeavors, which benefits society as a 
whole.218 This justification can be broken down into two steps. 
First, it assumes that individuals create the value of their 
personas through labor and effort. Professor Haemmerli likens 
this explanation to Lockean labor theory.219 For example, in 
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.,220 the only right 
of publicity case the United States Supreme Court has ever 
heard, the Court stated that “the State’s interest is closely 
analogous to the goals of patent and copyright law, focusing on 
the right of the individual to reap the reward of his 
endeavors.”221 Melville B. Nimmer, in his seminal article The 
Right of Publicity stated: 
It is also unquestionably true that in most instances a person achieves 
publicity values of substantial pecuniary worth only after he has 
expended considerable time, effort, skill, and even money. It would seem 
to be a first principle of Anglo-American jurisprudence . . . that every 
person is entitled to the fruit of his labors unless there are important 
countervailing public policy considerations.222 
  
 216 For example, adopting a trademark dilution justification leads to the 
conclusion that non-celebrities should not be protected by the right of publicity. See 
infra notes 238-44 and accompanying text. 
 217 See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text. 
 218 Kwall, supra note 56, at 35 (“Proponents of the right of publicity often rely 
on a copyright law analogy and argue that publicity rights are needed to spur 
incentives to creation just as copyright law exists, by constitutional command, to 
enhance economic incentives for the betterment of society.” (footnote omitted)). 
 219 Haemmerli, supra note 9, at 412-13. 
 220 433 U.S. 562 (1977). 
 221 Id. at 573. 
 222 Nimmer, supra note 127, at 216. Other commentators frequently invoke labor 
theory justifications. See Goldstein & Kessler, supra note 16, at 819 (“Justification for 
affording legal protection to the performer rests on the theory that anyone who contributes 
something of value to society should be entitled to share in the fruits of his labor.”); Coyne, 
supra note 6, at 812 (“[B]y permitting individuals to benefit from their personal efforts, both 
[the right of publicity and copyright] provide incentive for creative endeavor.”). 
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The second step of the justification contends that 
protecting the fruits of labor incentivizes creativity, which benefits 
society. Zacchini concludes: “the protection provides an economic 
incentive for [the performer] to make the investment required to 
produce a performance of interest to the public.”223 This 
justification is analogous to the justification for copyright law.224  
Professor Madow questions both of these propositions. 
First, he argues that the celebrities with the most valuable 
images are not necessarily the hardest working.225 Second, he 
argues that there are powerful noneconomic motivations for 
fame, which dilute the need for the right of publicity as an 
incentive for creativity.226 
Looking to collective bargaining at the rank-and-file 
level within the entertainment industry shines some light on 
whether the most talented actors get the best roles. Many 
assume, to justify the higher compensation in the Contract, 
that union members are higher-quality actors compared with 
non-unionized actors.227 However, Emily C. Chi questions 
whether entertainment union members are really better, 
arguing that this assumption is a myth.228 According to her, 
entertainment unions “operate de facto closed shops.”229 
Through strong union security clauses, and economic coercion 
of employers, the actors’ unions require actors to be members 
to get roles.230 However, actors have difficulty becoming 
  
 223 Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 576. 
 224 See id. (“This same consideration underlies . . . copyright laws long 
enforced by this Court.”); Coyne, supra note 6, at 813 (“Apparently, lurking beneath the 
surface in both publicity right and copyright decisions is the notion that ‘protection 
exists primarily not to benefit the artist, but rather to benefit the public by offering 
artists economic incentives to create.’” (quoting Note, Human Cannonballs and the 
First Amendment: Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 30 STAN. L. REV. 
1185, 1192 (1978))). 
 225 Madow, supra note 3, at 213 (“A handful of ‘superstars’ command huge 
audiences and huge incomes, while everybody else—including persons only slightly less 
talented than the stars, or more talented and less lucky or ruthless—is ‘pushed to the 
back’ and ‘unrewarded.’”). 
 226 Id. at 214 (“There is, first of all, the desire for fame itself: for renown, for 
recognition, for glory, for liberation from powerless anonymity. There is the satisfaction of 
realizing and exercising one’s talents, of developing and displaying proficiency at some 
difficult or complicated activity. There is the pleasure of winning people’s applause, 
inspiring their love or awe, earning their respect or gratitude.” (footnote omitted)). 
 227 See, e.g., Memorandum from Douglas J. Wood, Reed Smith LLP, on Unions & the 
Prod. of Commercials for Traditional & Non-Traditional Media 3 (Jan. 28, 2009), available at 
http://www.adlawbyrequest.com/uploads/file/Why%20be%20an%20Authorizer.pdf (“Without 
doubt, union performers are the best professional and sought after performers for 
commercials. They understand their craft and bring great efficiency to the workplace.”). 
 228 Chi, supra note 83, at 65-70. 
 229 Id. at 11. 
 230 Id. at 37-44. 
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members of the actors’ unions.231 For example, there are only 
three ways to become a member of SAG: to be cast in a SAG 
production as a principal performer,232 to work as an extra on a 
SAG production for three days,233 or to be a dues-paying 
member of an equivalent acting union.234 But since the unions 
control the supply of jobs in the industry, a non-union actor has 
significant difficulty joining SAG.235 Therefore, the difference 
between those that make it into the union and those that do 
not becomes, in large part, a question of luck rather than 
skill.236 Referencing the collective bargaining relationship here 
provides further support for Professor Madow’s position that 
the value of a personality in entertainment is not proportional 
to the amount of the individual’s effort. This undercuts the 
labor theory as a justification for the right of publicity and 
questions the validity of any analogy to copyright. 
B. Diminution in Value and Trademark 
Another common argument for the right of publicity is 
that it protects against diminishment in the value of persona. 
The right of publicity allows individuals to maximize upon the 
value of their persona through licensing at a specified price-per-
use, which ensures that advertisers to whom the persona is most 
valuable will purchase it.237 However, “[u]nrestricted use of a 
person’s name or likeness makes that name or likeness less scarce 
and thus, less valuable,”238 which justifies a property protection. 
This justification is analogous to trademark dilution under the 
Lanham Act.239 Traditional trademark infringement requires proof 
  
 231 Id. 
 232 Id. at 40. 
 233 Id. at 41. 
 234 See id. (describing how SAG controls the extras in many productions and 
how only a “small number of lucky extras may be assigned an ‘unscripted line’ while 
they are on the set”). 
 235 Id.  
 236 Id. at 68 (“Due to the element of arbitrariness in the determination of which 
actors become members of the union, the lack of regular . . . SAG-provided training to 
ensure some basic level of skill and experience, and the uncertainty regarding the reasons 
why producers have not substantially resisted union control over the acting labor 
supply, . . . SAG [cannot] hold itself out as an expert arbiter of quality or talent.”). 
 237 Madow, supra note 3, 223 (summarizing Richard Posner’s argument). 
 238 Konsky, supra note 8, at 350. 
 239 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2006) (“Subject to the principles of equity, the 
owner of a famous mark that is distinctive, inherently or through acquired 
distinctiveness, shall be entitled to an injunction against another person who, at any 
time after the owner’s mark has become famous, commences use of a mark or trade 
name in commerce that is likely to cause dilution by blurring or dilution by 
tarnishment of the famous mark.”); see also Greene, supra note 2, at 532-33 (“The 
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that the violator’s use creates consumer confusion.240 Trademark 
dilution, an alternative theory, requires a showing that the mark 
is famous and distinctive but requires no showing of consumer 
confusion.241 Congress promulgated this section to protect famous 
trademarks from diminishment in value by overuse, even when 
the use causes no consumer confusion.242 Arguably, trademark 
dilution is analogous to the right of publicity because both aim to 
protect a commercially valuable intangible property from 
diminishing in value. As a result, commentators often assert that 
the right of publicity should be restricted by the same limits 
placed on trademark dilution,243 which would require the mark to 
be distinctive and famous.244 
But rank-and-file actors in commercials also face 
overexposure. An advertiser’s unrestricted use of a commercial 
leads to the principal performer becoming associated with the 
product. As a result, there is a risk that other advertisers will 
not hire the performer for new commercials.245 The Commercials 
Contracts address this overexposure problem with the 
compensation scheme; holding fees and residuals compensate 
principal performers proportional to the damage to their 
images from overexposure.246  
However, the Commercials Contracts also prove that 
non-famous individuals have valuable personas. Performers 
that receive contract-scale wages are not famous, as well-
known individuals command significantly higher wages 
through overscale contracts.247 Additionally, unionized 
  
overexposure theory is very close, if not identical, to a dilution-by-blurring 
theory . . . . The theory underlying dilution is that, if the law permits willy-nilly use of 
trademark, even if consumer confusion is evident, there is still harm to the mark-
holder, who has invested goodwill in its mark . . . .”). 
 240 Konsky, supra note 8, at 354. 
 241 Id. (“Unlike a trademark infringement action, a trademark dilution action 
can be brought in the absence of consumer confusion about the goods.”); see also 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1125(c)(1) (stating that plaintiff can seek injunction “regardless of the presence or 
absence of actual or likely confusion, of competition, or of actual economic injury”). 
 242 Konsky, supra note 8, at 354 (“Trademark dilution law is concerned with 
protecting a trademark owner against uses that ‘whittle away’ the value of the mark, 
diminishing its uniqueness.”). 
 243 Id. at 359 (“The current right of publicity should be replaced with a right of 
publicity dilution, similar to trademark dilution law. A right of publicity dilution would 
prohibit the most harmful uses of a person’s name or likeness without chilling valuable 
commentary.”). 
 244 Id. at 355. 
 245 See supra note 207. 
 246 See supra notes 203-09 and accompanying text. 
 247 See Chi, supra note 83, at 21 (“Most of the members of these unions are 
neither rich nor famous; it is only in the entertainment industry that huge disparities 
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advertisers must pay union wages to everyone that appears as 
a principal, including uncast individuals in reality situations.248 
These uncast individuals are not well-known or famous, but 
business practice still compensates them for damage to their 
images through holding fees and residual payments. While the 
diminution-in-value justification is an apt similarity between 
trademark and right-of-publicity law, personalities are not 
trademarks. Transplanting trademark dilution onto the right 
of publicity discriminates against non-celebrities, as it would 
protect only famous individuals despite the business practice of 
compensating non-famous for damage to their personas. 
C. Unjust Enrichment 
Courts and commentators often invoke an unjust 
enrichment justification for the right of publicity. This 
justification maintains that the law must protect individuals from 
misappropriators.249 For example, the Supreme Court has stated 
that “[t]he rationale for protecting the right of publicity is the 
straight-forward one of preventing unjust enrichment by theft of 
good will. No social purpose is served by having the defendant get 
free some aspect of the plaintiff that would have market value 
and for which he would normally pay.”250 Additionally, Judge 
Holmes, dissenting in O’Brien, advocated for a right-of-publicity-
like right251 because appropriation “is contrary to usage and 
custom among advertisers in the marts of trade. They are 
undoubtedly in the habit of buying the right to use one’s name or 
picture to create demand and good will for their merchandise.”252 
  
exist without limits between the salaries and overall market values of unionized 
superstars and rank-and-file members.” (footnote omitted)). 
 248 See, e.g., PRINDLE, supra note 131, at 11 (“Many nonactors have joined 
because, for example, they happened to become caught up in a ‘real people’ television 
commercial while shopping at a supermarket one day, thereby earning the right to 
acquire a SAG card.”). “Uncast” performers refer to principal performers under the 
Commercials Contract who the producers select during the shooting of the commercial 
rather than prior to the shooting through a casting process. For a description of how 
advertisers utilize uncast performers in advertisements, see infra note 284. 
 249 Kwall, supra note 10, at 85 (“It is perhaps easiest to see the harm that the 
presence of unjust enrichment engenders for the publicity plaintiff, and her relatives 
and assignees, since they are being denied the value of the defendant’s gain by virtue of 
the unauthorized appropriation.”). 
 250 Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 563, 576 (1977) (quoting 
Harry Kalven, Jr., Privacy in Tort Law: Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 326, 331 (1966)) (brackets omitted). 
 251 O’Brien v. Pabst Sales Co., 124 F.2d 167, 170 (5th Cir. 1942) (Holmes, J., 
dissenting). 
 252 Id. at 171. 
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Residual payments provide an apt analogy to the unjust 
enrichment justification for the right of publicity. The unions 
demanded residual payments in response to the emergence of 
new technology that allowed reproduction of actors’ 
performances.253According to the union, compensation for the 
reuse of the broadcast was fair because the technology 
distributed its members’ performances for free when consumers 
would customarily pay for them.254 Therefore, the residuals 
compensate performers for the unjust enrichment that 
advertisers receive from reusing advertisements, as the 
industry has historically compensated actors for each 
performance. After referencing the business custom, the unjust 
enrichment justification is persuasive. This conclusion affirms 
that the right of publicity has a theoretically grounded purpose 
within our jurisprudence. Additionally, it suggests that when 
analyzing the doctrine within the right of publicity, the right 
should be approached from an unjust enrichment angle rather 
than a quasi-copyright or trademark. 
D. Natural Rights Theory 
Advocates for the right of publicity justify it by arguing 
control over persona is an innate and natural right. Infringing 
on the right of publicity damages more than the commercial 
value of the persona; it also takes away the individual’s natural 
right to control the use of their persona.255 Professor McCarthy, 
for one, argues that “[p]erhaps nothing is so strongly intuited 
as the notion that my identity is mine—it is my property to 
control as I see fit. Those who are critical of this principle 
should have the burden to articulate some important 
countervailing social policy which negates this natural impulse 
of justice.”256 Professor Haemmerli draws upon the philosophy of 
Immanuel Kant to intellectually strengthen the natural rights 
justification for the right of publicity.257 Haemmerli concludes, 
  
 253 See supra Part I.C. For example, in radio, the unions negotiated for 
residuals following the radio stations’ shift from having actors perform in each time 
zone to replaying the same recorded broadcast in each time zone. See supra notes 148-
54 and accompanying text. 
 254 See supra notes 148-54 and accompanying text. 
 255 See, e.g., Haemmerli, supra note 9, at 385-86 (“The right of publicity can 
also be viewed as a property right grounded in human autonomy. As such, it belongs to 
all, . . . and it embraces noneconomic objections to the commercial exploitation of 
identity.” (footnote omitted)). 
 256 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 2:1. 
 257 Haemmerli, supra note 9, at 416. 
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“The central concept of autonomy in Kantian philosophy could 
lend itself to a philosophical justification of a right of publicity. 
Autonomy implies the individual’s right to control the use of 
her own person, since interference with one’s person is a direct 
infringement of the innate right of freedom . . . .”258 
Analyzing a natural rights justification from the 
perspective of a consensual agreement seems counterintuitive. 
However, the Commercials Contracts provide some support for 
the natural rights justification. When the performer agrees to 
appear in a specific commercial, the Commercials Contracts 
allow advertisers discretion over when, where, and how much 
the advertisement will run, like a property rule;259 yet, the 
advertiser has to compensate the performer for its usage, which 
acts as a liability rule.260 When the producer extends the 
performer’s use beyond the agreed-upon terms by using the 
performer in a new commercial, the performer can prevent the 
use by going through arbitration or the judicial process.261 
Therefore, the idea that performers have an innate right to 
control their personas pervades even collective bargaining 
agreements in entertainment. The natural rights justification 
reinforces the unjust enrichment justification as well: rather 
than efficiently allocating property—like copyright or 
trademark—the right of publicity promotes fairness for 
individuals whose identities are misappropriated. Thus, the 
rules within the right of publicity ought to operate as natural 
property rights that prevent unjust enrichment. 
IV. EVALUATING DOCTRINAL RULES WITHIN THE RIGHT OF 
PUBLICITY 
The Commercials Contracts provide a point of reference 
to evaluate how the right of publicity actually operates within 
the law. Specifically, this part will analyze the underlying 
assumptions of rules that operate within the right-of-publicity 
jurisprudence by paralleling the rules to business practice, as 
seen through the Commercials Contracts. 
  
 258 Id. 
 259 See supra Part II.B.2. 
 260 See supra Part II.B.2. 
 261 See supra note 212 and accompanying text. 
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A. Right of Publicity to Non-Celebrities 
The question of whether the right of publicity extends to 
non-celebrities is the most apparent division between 
jurisdictions. Because the right of publicity evolved out of 
celebrities’ struggles to recover under the right of privacy, the 
question of whether non-celebrities could recover for 
appropriation of commercial value of their personalities has 
divided both courts and commentators. The bulk of 
jurisdictions recognize a cause of action for individuals who are 
not famous personalities.262 These jurisdictions follow Melville 
B. Nimmer’s principle: 
It is impractical to attempt to draw a line as to which persons have 
achieved the status of celebrity and which have not; it should rather 
be held that every person has the property right of publicity, but 
that damages which a person may claim for infringement of the right 
will depend upon the value of the publicity appropriated which in 
turn will depend in great measure upon the degree of fame attained 
by the plaintiff.263 
  
 262 See, e.g., Bowling v. Missionary Servants of the Most Holy Trinity, No. 91-
5920, 1992 WL 181427, at *5 (6th Cir. July 20, 1992) (holding that under Kentucky 
common law a non-celebrity has a right of publicity cause of action); Motschenbacher v. 
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821, 825 n.11 (9th Cir. 1974) (recognizing in dicta 
that under California common law non-celebrities have a cause of action for the right of 
publicity); Fanelle v. Lojack Corp., No. CIV.A. 99-4292, 2000 WL 1801270, at *11 (E.D. 
Pa. Dec. 7, 2000) (“I am convinced that the right of publicity resides in every person, 
not just famous and infamous individuals.”); KNB Enters. v. Matthews, 92 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 713, 722 n.12 (Cal. 2d. Dist. 2000) (“In our view, determining preemption of a 
plaintiff’s section 3344 claim on the basis of the plaintiff’s celebrity status would be 
violative of California law. Under California law, the statutory right of publicity exists 
for celebrity and non-celebrity plaintiffs alike.”); Dora v. Frontline Video, Inc., 18 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 790, 792 n.2 (Cal. 2d. Dist. 1993) (recognizing in dicta that under California 
common law non-celebrities have a cause of action for the right of publicity); Martin 
Luther King, Jr., Ctr. for Soc. Change, Inc. v. Am. Heritage Prods., Inc., 296 S.E.2d 
697, 703 (Ga. 1982) (concluding that the right of publicity exists “whether the person 
whose name and likeness is used is a private citizen, entertainer, or as here a public 
figure who is not a public official”); Fergerstrom v. Hawaiian Ocean View Estates, 441 
P.2d 141, 144 (Haw. 1968) (holding that there was a right of publicity cause of action 
for a private citizen); Ainsworth v. Century Supply Co., 693 N.E.2d 510, 514 (Ill. App. 
1998) (holding that the right of publicity extends to non-celebrities); Canessa v. J.I. 
Kislak, Inc., 235 A.2d 62, 75 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law. Div. 1967) (“[I]t seems to us that 
however little or much plaintiff’s likeness and name may be worth, defendant, who has 
appropriated them for his commercial benefit, should be made to pay for what he has 
taken . . . .”); Cohen v. Herbal Concepts, Inc., 473 N.Y.S.2d 426, 431 (N.Y. App. 
Div.1984) (“The legislative protection is clear, extending to ‘any person’ within the 
general public, not merely to those with a publicly identifiable feature . . . .”); see also 1 
MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 4:14 (“[T]he majority of commentators and courts hold that 
everyone, celebrity and noncelebrity alike, has a right of publicity.”). 
 263 Nimmer, supra note 127, at 217. 
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These jurisdictions presume that the non-famous 
individual’s persona has commercial value based upon the 
defendant’s usage in a way that exploits the persona for 
commercial benefit.264 This standard comports to the unjust 
enrichment and natural rights justifications: the advertiser 
receives the plaintiff’s image without his or her consent, which 
violates the non-famous person’s natural rights.265 And the 
advertiser would normally pay for such services, which 
suggests unjust enrichment.266 The question of the value of the 
plaintiff’s persona only becomes a factor when determining 
compensatory damages. Although the amount of compensatory 
damages may be insignificant when a non-celebrity is 
commercially exploited, many states permit right-of-publicity 
plaintiffs to disgorge profits267 and recover punitive damages 
from misappropriators.268 For example, in Christoff v. Nestle, a 
jury awarded over $15 million dollars in profits to an unknown 
model, who had been working as a kindergarten teacher, for 
using his picture on coffee packaging.269  
Other courts have refused to extend the right of 
publicity to individuals with unknown personas.270 Often these 
  
 264 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 4:17 (“The courts use the commonsense rule 
that if defendant uses plaintiff’s personal identity for commercial purposes, then it will 
be presumed that plaintiff’s identity had commercial value. This presumption is similar 
to a presumption well established in trademark law.”). 
 265 Many commentators endorse, at least in theory, a broad right of publicity 
that applies to everyone because of natural rights theory. See Greene, supra note 2, at 
538 (“[D]enying a publicity claim to a non-celebrity discounts personality rationales of 
personhood . . . . Arguments against non-celebrity right of publicity claims, regardless of 
merit, in effect value commercial speech over rights of personhood.” (footnote omitted)); 
see also Goodman, supra note 4, at 249 (“[T]he right of publicity must protect all persons 
and must not become a special interest right for celebrities only.”); Kwall, supra note 10, 
at 55-56 (“This Author believes that the right of publicity has the potential for 
safeguarding from unauthorized use any marketable and publicly recognizable attribute 
of any individual, regardless of whether that person is a celebrity.”); James M. Treece, 
Commercial Exploitation of Names, Likenesses, and Personal Histories, 51 TEX. L. REV. 
637, 648 (1973) (“[A] non-celebrity can argue, if he chooses, that an advertising use of his 
personality has unlawfully invaded an economic interest.”). 
 266 See supra note 249 and accompanying text. 
 267 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 22, § 11:34 (“In the analogous areas of trademark 
and copyright infringement, recovery of the profits made by defendant from the 
infringing sales are a standard form of monetary recovery.”). 
 268 Id. § 11:36 (“Under the law of most states, punitive or exemplary damages 
may be obtained in privacy and publicity suits.”). 
 269 Christoff v. Nestle, Inc., 213 P.3d 132, 133-34 (Cal. 2009). The Supreme 
Court of California later overturned the verdict because the statute of limitations 
barred plaintiff’s claim, unless the plaintiff could show that the defendant had 
hindered the plaintiff’s discovery of the unauthorized use of his likeness. Id. at 134. 
 270 See, e.g., Vassiliades v. Garfinckel’s, Brooks Bros., 492 A.2d 580, 592 (D.C. 
Cir. 1985) (holding that the plaintiff had no cause of action because her likeness lacked 
value); Pesina v. Midway Mfg. Co., 948 F. Supp. 40, 42 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (“The plaintiff 
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courts require proof that a plaintiff’s personality has objective 
value outside of the alleged commercial use. For example, in 
Cheatham v. Paisano Pub., Inc., the court developed a 
threshold test to determine whether a plaintiff’s identity has 
commercial value:271 “Commercial value may be established by 
proof of (1) the distinctiveness of the identity and by (2) the 
degree of recognition of the person among those receiving the 
publicity.”272 Courts that follow this reasoning reject the 
presumption that the commercial exploitation by a defendant 
proves that a plaintiff’s persona has value.  
Several commentators have supported denying the right 
of publicity to non-celebrities.273 In particular, those who 
advocate for a trademark-dilution analogy assert that the right 
of publicity should not protect non-celebrities because 
trademark law does not protect unknown marks.274 Others 
argue that the First Amendment bars non-celebrity right-of-
publicity claims.275 For instance, Alicia Hunt argues that 
protecting the right of publicity for celebrities is a state interest 
substantial enough to pass the First Amendment’s protection of 
  
claiming the infringement of this right must show that, prior to the defendant’s use, 
the plaintiff’s name, likeness, or persona had commercial value.”); Cheatham v. 
Paisano Pub., Inc., 891 F. Supp. 381, 386 (W.D. Ky. 1995) (ruling that plaintiffs must 
prove commercial value to establish a right of publicity claim); Barnako v. Foto Kirsch, 
Ltd., Civ. A. No. 86-1700, 1987 WL 10230, at *2 (D.D.C. Apr. 16, 1987) (“[T]he plaintiff 
must allege, and later prove, that the defendant’s commercial benefit was derived from 
the identity of the plaintiff and the value or reputation which the public associates 
with that identity.”); Jackson v. Playboy Enters., 574 F. Supp. 10, 13 (S.D. Ohio 1983) 
(“[T]he complaint must allege that plaintiff’s name or likeness has some intrinsic value, 
which was taken by defendant for its own benefit, commercial or otherwise.”); Ali v. 
Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723, 729 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (suggesting in dicta that the right 
of publicity may not extend to non-celebrities under New York’s right to privacy 
statute); Cox v. Hatch, 761 P.2d 556, 564 (Utah 1988) (“[T]he complaint fails because it 
must allege that the plaintiffs’ names or likenesses have some ‘intrinsic value’ that was 
used or appropriated for the defendants’ benefit.” (citing Jackson, 574 F. Supp. at 13)). 
 271 Cheatham, 891 F. Supp. at 386. 
 272 Id. 
 273 See, e.g., Howard I. Berkman, Note, The Right of Publicity—Protection for 
Public Figures and Celebrities, 42 BROOK. L. REV. 527, 533 (1976) (“In a suit grounded 
upon the commercial appropriation of a private individual’s name or picture, the correct 
measure of damages is the extent of injury to the individual’s feelings and not the value 
that the defendant received from the unauthorized use of his name or picture.”). 
 274 See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 5, at 1166 (“Doctrinally, such an approach 
would limit the right to circumstances in which the use of an individual’s name or 
likeness in connection with the sale of a product is likely either to confuse consumers or 
to dilute the significance of a famous name.”); Konsky, supra note 8, at 366-70 (arguing 
for a requirement that the plaintiff be distinct and famous in order to recover for the 
right of publicity). 
 275 See, e.g., Hunt, supra note 23, at 1609 (“The extension of the right of 
publicity to noncelebrities is disturbing because in many instances, it interferes with 
the First Amendment’s protection of commercial speech.”). 
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commercial speech, but that the interest in protecting the right 
of publicity of non-celebrities is not substantial enough.276 Under 
the Central Hudson277 precedent, the standard for determining 
if restrictions on commercial speech violate the First 
Amendment, “the government may restrict truthful and 
nonmisleading commercial speech only if it proves (1) it has a 
substantial state interest in regulating speech, (2) the 
regulation directly and materially advances the interest, and 
(3) the regulation is no more extensive than necessary to serve 
that interest.”278 Hunt concludes that the non-celebrities’ rights 
of publicity are not substantial under the test because non-
celebrities’ identities have no provable economic value.279 Hunt 
questions the legitimacy of the presumption that non-
celebrities have commercial value based on the manner that 
the infringer uses their persona, suggesting that the 
commercial value of non-famous people does not change by 
overuse.280 
Business practice under the Commercials Contracts 
sheds some light on this issue. In particular, business practice 
is integral to determine the rationality of the legal presumption 
that personas of non-celebrities have commercial value when 
commercially exploited. Undoubtedly, anyone working in a 
commercial under the union scale could hardly be considered 
“famous.”281 Nonetheless, these individuals receive 
  
 276 Id. at 1639-52. 
 277 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 
557 (1980). Various members of the Supreme Court have at times questioned the 
continued application of the Central Hudson standard. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. 
Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 518-19 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that in 
cases of restrictions on truthful commercial speech, Central Hudson balancing test 
should be replaced by per se violation of the First Amendment); id. at 517 (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (expressing “discomfort with the Central Hudson test, which seems to me 
to have nothing more than policy intuition to support it”); see also Sorrell v. IMS 
Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2664 (2011) (holding that content based restrictions on 
commercial speech receive heightened scrutiny rather than applying the balancing test 
established by Central Hudson). 
 278 Hunt, supra note 23, 1619-20. 
 279 Id. at 1643 (“[I]t is unlikely that the government’s interest would be 
‘substantial’ in cases involving private individuals with no level of fame, notoriety or 
goodwill attached to their identities. In these cases, the commercial value is merely 
‘presumed,’ even though there is no evidence that the identity in fact has any 
commercial value.”). 
 280 Id. at 1643-44. 
 281 “Union scale” refers to the minimum payments allowable under the 
Commercials Contracts. Commercial producers generally pay famous actors above the 
union scale. See Prindle, supra note 139, at 14 (“Before starting on a project, stars 
would have had their agents negotiate a work agreement much more favorable to 
themselves than is the standard SAG contract.”). 
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compensation for loss in the commercial value of their personas 
through residual payments. On the other hand, there may be 
an argument that an actor who consistently works under the 
Commercials Contracts has a persona with proven commercial 
value, and therefore passes the “intrinsic value” threshold. In 
commercials made under the Commercials Contracts, which 
make up 90 percent of all commercials made in the United 
States,282 all performers must be paid at least the union wage.283 
If the advertiser uses uncasted performers in its commercials, 
those performers must also be paid at least the union scale—
advertisers will on occasion pay residuals to anonymous 
individuals who are not professional actors.284 Therefore, 
advocates for a non-celebrity right are supported by industry 
practice in paying residuals to non-celebrities in the 
contractual setting. 
B. Incidental Use Exception for Fleeting and Insignificant Use 
Another doctrinal rule within the right of publicity that 
could be shaped by reference to the Commercials Contracts is 
the incidental use exception for fleeting and insignificant use. 
Seemingly every state that recognizes the right of publicity 
makes an exception to liability when the use is fleeting or 
insignificant.285 The straightforward reason for this exception is 
  
 282 Neff, supra note 167. 
 283 See SAG Commercials Contract, supra note 165, at Sch. B, § I(A)-(C) 
(requiring all principal performers to join the union within 30 days after hire in order 
to work on a union production); AFTRA Commercials Contract, supra note 165, at Sch. 
B, § I(A)-(C) (same); SAG Commercials Contract, supra note 165, at Sch. D, § 6(a) 
(setting forth minimum compensation for all extras on unionized productions); 
Commercials Contract, supra note 165, at Sch. C, § 2(a) (same). 
 284 See, e.g., PRINDLE, supra note 131, at 93 (“[A]dvertising agencies had fallen 
into the habit of using ‘real people’ in their TV commercials. Once they had appeared 
on screen, these nonprofessionals were eligible for a SAG card, which many of them 
acquired for its prestige value. No one in the guild knew how many members were thus 
nonactors, but there was widespread agreement that they swelled the membership lists 
without adding to the talent pool.”). 
 285 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(e) (West 1997) (“[I]t shall be a question of 
fact whether or not the use of the person’s name, voice, signature, photograph, or 
likeness was so directly connected with the commercial sponsorship or with the paid 
advertising as to constitute a use for which consent is required.”); FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 540.08(3)(c) (West 2007) (mandating that the right of publicity does not apply to 
“[a]ny photograph of a person solely as a member of the public and where such person 
is not named or otherwise identified in or in connection with the use of such 
photograph”); NEB. REV. ST. § 20-202(3) (2007) (mandating that the right of publicity 
does not apply to “[a]ny photograph of a person solely as a member of the public when 
such person is not named or otherwise identified in or in connection with the use of 
such photograph”); OKL. ST. ANN. tit. 12, § 1449(e) (West 2010) (“[I]t shall be a question 
of fact whether or not the use of the person’s name, voice, signature, photograph, or 
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that, in these cases, the individual’s persona is not being 
exploited commercially.286 Additionally, courts do not want to 
overburden expression by exposing parties to liability when an 
individual incidentally appears in media.287  
New York has the most developed incidental use 
doctrine. A court first invoked the incidental use doctrine in 
1915, under the right-to-privacy statute (which today also 
protects the right of publicity), in Merle v. Sociological 
Research Film Corp.288 There, the court ruled that a glimpse of 
the plaintiff’s business sign in defendant’s movie did not violate 
right-to-privacy law.289 Specifically, the court held that for there 
to be a violation under the right-to-privacy statute, “it must 
appear that the use of the plaintiff’s picture or name is itself for 
the purpose of trade and not merely an incidental part of a 
photograph.”290 The New York Court of Appeals in Gautier v. 
Pro-Football Company established a clear precedent when a 
defendant’s use of plaintiff’s name or likeness is incidental. In 
Gautier, the plaintiff was an animal trainer who performed 
during the half-time show for a professional football team.291 
The defendant broadcasted part of the plaintiff’s performance 
without the plaintiff’s express consent.292 The plaintiff filed a 
right-of-publicity-like claim under the privacy statute and 
claimed that the defendant appropriated his image for 
commercial purposes because advertisements aired during the 
broadcast.293 The court ruled that the defendant’s use of the 
plaintiff’s image was incidental because the use was not 
  
likeness was so directly connected with the commercial sponsorship or with the paid 
advertising as to constitute a use for which consent is required.”); Brown v. Twentieth 
Century Fox Film Corp., 799 F. Supp. 166, 172 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Gautier v. Pro-Football, 
Inc., 107 N.E.2d 485, 488-89 (N.Y. 1952); Vinci v. Am. Can Co., 591 N.E.2d 793, 794 (Ohio 
Ct. App. 1990); Henley v. Dillard Dep’t Stores, 46 F. Supp. 2d 587, 590 (N.D. Texas 1999); 
Cox v. Hatch, 761 P.2d 556, 563 (Utah 1988); Staruski v. Cont’l Tel. Co. of Vt., 581 A.2d 
266, 270 (Vt. 1990); Town & Country Props., Inc. v. Riggins, 457 S.E.2d 356, 363 (Va. 
1995). 
 286 See Aligo v. Time-Life Books, Inc., No. C 94-20707 JW, 1994 WL 715605, at 
*2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 1994) (“The rationale for this rule is that an incidental use has 
no commercial value.”). 
 287 See Preston v. Martin Bergman Prods., Inc. 765 F. Supp. 116, 120 (S.D.N.Y. 
1991) (“The doctrine of incidental use was developed to address concerns that penalizing 
every unauthorized use, no matter how insignificant or fleeting, of a person’s name or 
likeness would impose undue burdens on expressive activity, and carry consequences 
which were not intended by those who enacted the statute.”). 
 288 Merle v. Sociological Research Film Corp., 152 N.Y.S 829 (App. Div. 1915). 
 289 Id. at 831-32. 
 290 Id. at 832. 
 291 Gautier v. Pro-Football, Inc., 107 N.E.2d 485, 487 (N.Y. 1952). 
 292 Id. 
 293 Id. 
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directly related to the commercial purpose of the 
advertisement.294 The court reasoned that the plaintiff “was not 
connected with the product either by visual, oral or other 
reference, nor was any issue of fact created by the physical 
juxtaposition of the [commercial] prior to his performance.”295 
Consequently, the dispositive question under the Gautier 
decision is whether defendant’s use of plaintiff’s persona 
directly connects with plaintiff’s advertising or trade purpose. 
With varying results, New York continues to follow the 
Gautier test to determine incidental use today. Often this test 
leads to fair results, for instance when it is clear that the 
defendant’s usage does not exploit the plaintiff’s persona.296 
However, courts have ruled usage incidental when a plaintiff’s 
name or likeness clearly helped the defendant advertise.297 
Given the factual nature of the incidental use doctrine, courts 
often leave the question to juries.298 
California’s right-of-publicity statute requires the plaintiff 
to be identifiable in pictures299 and exempts liability when the 
individual is part of a group where he or she is “represented in the 
photograph solely as a result of being present at the time the 
photograph was taken and have not been singled out as 
individuals in any manner.”300 Additionally, California has a 
common law incidental use doctrine, which follows New York’s 
jurisprudence.301 In Aligo v. Time-Life, Books Inc., the court set out 
a test for determining when use is incidental:  
A number of factors are relevant in this regard: (1) whether the use 
has a unique quality or value that would result in commercial profit 
to the defendant, (2) whether the use contributes something of 
significance, (3) the relationship between the reference to the 
  
 294 Id. at 488. 
 295 Id. 
 296 See, e.g., Candelaria v. Spurlock, No. 08 Civ. 1830, 2008 WL 2640471, at *4 
(E.D.N.Y. July 3, 2008) (holding that the four second appearance of a fast food worker 
in a documentary about fast food was incidental). 
 297 See, e.g., D’Andrea v. Rafla-Demetrious, 972 F. Supp. 154, 157-58 
(E.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding that the defendant’s usage in a hospital brochure of a picture 
of the plaintiff working in a hospital was incidental because it did directly convey 
information about the hospital). 
 298 See Doe v. Darien Lake Theme Park & Camping Resort, Inc., 715 N.Y.S.2d 
825, 825-26 (App. Div. 2000) (ruling that incidental use is a question for the jury). 
 299 CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(b)(1) (West 1997) (“A person shall be deemed to be 
readily identifiable from a photograph when one who views the photograph with the 
naked eye can reasonably determine that the person depicted in the photograph is the 
same person who is complaining of its unauthorized use.”). 
 300 Id. § 3344(b)(3). 
 301 See, e.g., Aligo v. Time-Life Books, Inc., No. C 94-20707 JW, 1994 WL 
715605, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 1994). 
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plaintiff and the purpose and subject of the work, and (4) the 
duration, prominence or repetition of the name, or likeness relative 
to the rest of the publication.302 
The Commercials Contracts, and collective bargaining in 
the entertainment industry more generally, provide an apt basis 
for comparison to evaluate the rationality of the incidental use 
doctrine. Specifically, the divide between principal performers 
and extras in the Commercials Contracts mirror the incidental 
use doctrine. Principal performers receive residual compensation 
and holding fees for the usage of their personas;303 advertisers 
pay extras only session fees and no residuals or holding fees.304 
Therefore, an advertiser’s use of extras is analogous to 
unauthorized incidental usage: neither requires compensation 
for commercial exploitation of an individual’s persona. 
Historically, the entertainment industry treated acting 
and extra work as two completely different trades. SAG and 
AFTRA represented actors and performer; the Screen Extras 
Guild (SEG) represented extras.305 For example, the National 
Labor Relations Board excluded from an extras union’s 
jurisdiction individuals who performed more than extra work, 
including stunts, singing, or performances involving lines.306 
The decision explains, “all work before the motion picture 
camera falls primarily in two main classes, the one being 
known as acting work . . . and the other being known as extra 
work . . . customarily described in the industry as atmospheric 
or background work.”307 Although SEG disbanded in 1992 and 
SAG acquired SEG’s former jurisdiction,308 there is a historical 
norm of separating principal performers from extras. 
This norm is readily apparent in the Commercials 
Contracts. The contracts provide a general definition of a 
principal performer in a television commercial: “Anyone who is 
seen and who speaks a line or lines of dialogue . . . .”;309 
  
 302 See id. at *3 (citations omitted). 
 303 See supra notes 190-95 and accompanying text. 
 304 See SAG Commercials Contract, supra note 165, at sch. D, § 6; AFTRA 
Commercials Contract, supra note 165, sch. C, § 2. 
 305 Television and Movie Agreement—Collective Bargaining Agreement; Screen 
Actors Guild, American Federation of Television and Radio Artists, Alliance of Motion 
Picture and Television Producers, MONTHLY LABOR REV. (Aug. 1992), http://findarticles.com/ 
p/articles/mi_m1153/is_n8_v115/ai_12624085/. 
 306 In re R.K.O. Radio Pictures, Inc., 61 N.L.R.B. 112 (1945). 
 307 Id. at 113. 
 308 Television and Movie Agreement, supra note 305. 
 309 SAG Commercials Contract, supra note 165, § 6(A); AFTRA Commercials 
Contract, supra note 165, § 6(A)(1). 
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“[a]nyone whose face appears silent, alone in a stationary 
camera shot, and is identified with the product . . . .”310; or 
“[a]nyone whose face appears silent and is identifiable and 
whose foreground performance demonstrates or illustrates a 
product or service, or illustrates or reacts to the on- or off-
camera narration or commercial message.”311 The contracts treat 
performers not within the general definition of the principal 
performer as extras,312 with several exceptions for, among other 
things, close-ups,313 stunt performers,314 dancers,315 and off-camera 
voice usage.316 The detailed distinction between a principal 
performer and an extra provides a framework to determine 
when a television commercial uses an individual’s persona.  
The division between principal performers and extras 
leads to two observations about the right of publicity. First, it 
demonstrates that the connection between the advertising 
purpose and the individual’s part within the commercial affect 
whether the individual will receive compensation for reuse of 
persona. This can be seen in the definition of a principal 
performer within the Commercials Contracts for “foreground 
performance [that] demonstrates or illustrates a product or 
service or illustrates or reacts to the on or off-camera narration 
or commercial message.”317 This standard parallels Gautier’s 
directly-related-to-the-advertising-or-trade-purpose standard 
for incidental use in a right-of-publicity case.  
Second, the Commercials Contracts present a reference 
point for courts to use when determining if an unauthorized 
appropriation of identity is incidental in a television 
commercial. Courts should find unauthorized use—and not 
incidental use—in a commercial that qualifies as principal 
  
 310 SAG Commercials Contract, supra note 165, § 6(B); AFTRA Commercials 
Contract, supra note 165, § 6(A)(2). 
 311 SAG Commercials Contract, supra note 165, § 6(C); AFTRA Commercials 
Contract, supra note 165, § 6(A)(3). 
 312 SAG Commercials Contract, supra note 165, § 6(C) (“Persons appearing in the 
foreground solely as atmosphere and not otherwise covered by the foregoing shall be deemed 
extra performers.”); AFTRA Commercials Contract, supra note 165, § 6(A)(4) (same). 
 313 SAG Commercials Contract, supra note 165, § 6(D); AFTRA Commercials 
Contract, supra note 165, § 6(A)(4). 
 314 SAG Commercials Contract, supra note 165, § 6(F) (“Stunt performers 
need not be identifiable per se; only the stunt performed need be identifiable.”); AFTRA 
Commercials Contract, supra note 165, § 6(A)(6) (same). 
 315 SAG Commercials Contract, supra note 165, § 6(G); AFTRA Commercials 
Contract, supra note 165, § 6(A)(7). 
 316 SAG Commercials Contract, supra note 165, § 6(H); AFTRA Commercials 
Contract, supra note 165, § 6(A)(8). 
 317 SAG Commercials Contract, supra note 165, § 6(C); AFTRA Commercials 
Contract, supra note 165, § 6(A)(3). 
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performance under the Commercials Contracts. By referencing 
the Commercials Contracts, courts gain an elaborate 
benchmark when considering if the use is directly related to 
the advertising or trade purpose. 
Use of the Commercials Contracts in this context is easy to 
apply. For example, in Pooley v. National Hole-in-One Ass’n, the 
plaintiff won a million dollars from the defendant for hitting a 
hole-in-one in a competition.318 The defendant used six seconds of 
footage of the plaintiff winning the competition without the 
plaintiff’s consent during an eight-minute infomercial advertising 
the defendant’s services.319 Although the plaintiff appeared only 
briefly, his appearance was integral to the infomercial, as he was 
the only winner of the defendant’s competitions. The court found, 
applying the Aligo standard, that the incidental use doctrine did 
not apply.320 Under the Commercials Contracts, the plaintiff’s part 
within the infomercial would qualify him as a principal 
performer. The plaintiff’s “face appear[ed]” and his “foreground 
performance demonstrate[d] or illustrate[d]” the defendant’s 
service, as he actually won the contest.321  
CONCLUSION 
Courts and commentators should no longer automatically 
look to other intellectual property rights or academic frameworks 
when analyzing the right of publicity. Instead, with common 
origins and analogous rights to the right of publicity, collective 
bargaining agreements in entertainment provide an appropriate 
tool to scrutinize both the substantive rules and policy 
justifications for the right of publicity. Unjust enrichment and 
natural rights justifications for the right of publicity are supported 
by reference to the Commercials Contracts. Furthermore, the 
Commercials Contracts favor extending the right of publicity to 
non-celebrities. Finally, courts and lawmakers can import the 
Commercials Contracts when analyzing whether an unauthorized 
use of an individual’s image or persona is incidental.  
The comparison to the Commercials Contracts is not 
necessarily limited to these points. The right of publicity and 
collective bargaining agreements both face the challenge of 
  
 318 Pooley v. Nat’l Hole-in-One Ass’n, 89 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1109 (D. Ariz. 2000). 
 319 Id. at 1110-11. 
 320 Id. at 1113 (“There is nothing, however, insignificant about the use of 
Plaintiff’s name and footage in the videotape. His name, while only briefly mentioned, 
prominently stands out as the highlight of Defendant’s advertisement.”). 
 321 See supra note 317 and accompanying text. 
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adapting to rapidly changing technology.322 When faced with these 
new technologies, looking to how collective bargaining agreements 
have dealt with these new obstacles may be the best way to shape 
the right of publicity in a rational manner going forward. 
Andrew T. Coyle† 
  
 322 Compare Anthony L. Pessino, Note, Mistaken Identity: A Call to Strengthen 
Publicity Rights for Digital Personas, 4 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 86 (2004) (arguing that 
new uses of digital technology necessitate strengthening the right of publicity), with 
Craig J. Ackermann, E-Issues Take Center Stage: The 2000 SAG/AFTRA Strike, 8 
VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 293 (2002) (describing how labor disputes within 
entertainment collective bargaining all relate to advances in technology).  
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